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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2005, Carol Ernst, whose husband had died a few years ear-
lier after taking the drug Vioxx, confronted Merck, the company that made 
the drug, in a Texas courtroom.1  Through her attorney, Mark Lanier, she 
accused the company of rushing the drug to market without properly assur-
ing it was safe and failing to warn consumers of its risks.  This wrongful 
behavior, she argued, killed her husband.2  The jury agreed.3 
Carol Ernst‘s trial, the first involving the Vioxx drug, got nearly as 
much attention in the pages of the Wall Street Journal as the Enron trial had 
a few years before.  For the pharmaceutical industry, and the business 
community more broadly, the Vioxx litigation was a bellwether for the state 
of the civil justice system.  If Mrs. Ernst and other plaintiffs won, Merck‘s 
stock would continue to take a beating.  The company might even go under.   
All because under state tort law, individuals like Mrs. Ernst could go 
before a jury—a group of lay people with no expertise in science, medicine, 
or the pharmaceutical industry—and second-guess the sales and marketing 
of a drug that the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had ap-
proved as safe and adequately labeled.4  The jury could then decide on a 
multimillion dollar award for a plaintiff on the ground that the company 
should have done something differently.   
 
 
 
1
  See Posting of Daniel Keller to First Vioxx Trial, Carol Ernst Testifies Vioxx Risks Unknown, 
http://firstvioxxtrial.blogspot.com/2005_08_01_archive.html (Aug. 5, 2005, 17:35 EST) (describing 
Ernst‘s testimony).  See also Plaintiffs‘ Original Petition, Ernst v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 19961*BH02 
(Tex. Dist. May 24, 2002), 2002 WL 32902034. 
2
  See generally Janice G. Inman, First Vioxx Ruling: What Does It Mean for Merck?, 24 No. 3 
LJN‘S PROD. LIAB. L. & STRATEGY 3 (Sept. 2005) (summarizing Ernst‘s and Merck‘s arguments and 
strategy at trial).  
3
  The original jury verdict of $253 million was reduced by the judge to $26 million in accordance 
with a recently passed Texas ―tort reform‖ provision.  See Ernst v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 19961*BH02, 
2006 WL 4661007 (Tex. Dist. June 23, 2006) (ordering that Ernst recover from Merck the sum of $26.1 
million); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008(b) (Vernon 2008) (―Exemplary damages 
awarded against a defendant may not exceed an amount equal to the greater of: (1)(A) two times the 
amount of economic damages; plus (B) an amount equal to any noneconomic damages found by the 
jury, not to exceed $750,000; or (2) $200,000.‖).  The verdict was eventually overturned a few years lat-
er on appeal, on the ground of insufficient evidence of causation.  See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Ernst, --- 
S.W.3d ---, 2009 WL 1677857 (Tex. App. June 4, 2009). 
I offer this case as an example of the kind of case that is at stake in preemption and tort reform de-
bates because the particular case was a high profile one, and the kind of case—challenging the side ef-
fects of a drug—is particularly relevant to preemption.  My use of it is not meant as an endorsement of 
its clearly excessive verdict. 
4
  See Joyce B. Margarce & Michelle R. Scheiffele, Is the Preemption Defense for PMA-Approved 
Medical Devices in Jeopardy?, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 12, 23 (2008).  In recent litigation, a medical device 
company, Medtronic, Inc., argued, as could pharmaceutical companies like Merck, that ―allowing plain-
tiffs‘ claims to proceed to juries to impose their own ad hoc requirements contrary to those set up by the 
FDA would ‗guarantee chaos in the controlling standards, unprincipled second guessing of FDA regula-
tory enforcement decisions, and a flood of scientifically dubious warnings.‘‖  Id. 
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And the first Vioxx trial might have been just the beginning.  The next 
day, in the next courtroom—or one in Arkansas, or Oklahoma, or New Jer-
sey—the whole process could, and did, start again.  Different juries could 
make different decisions about whether Merck behaved wrongfully, and 
about the extent to which it should be punished if it did.5  For critics of the 
civil justice system, this was a perfect example of a system out of control.  
If people expected companies like Merck to invest in research and devel-
opment, this process of allowing jury second-guessing through tort law had 
to end.6  
So while Merck aggressively litigated these cases, the business com-
munity pursued a long-term strategy as well.  Working closely with the 
Bush Administration, industries got administrative agencies like the FDA 
and the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration, which regu-
lates auto safety, to insert ―preemption‖ provisions into their regulations.7  
These provisions were designed to tell courts that the federal regulation in 
that area ought to prevent individuals from bringing state-law claims.  The 
aim of these preemption provisions was to keep plaintiffs like Mrs. Ernst 
out of court. 
The preemption strategy of the Bush Administration and the business 
community has since received much attention both in the media8 and among 
legal scholars.  Scholars have criticized a more expansive approach to 
preemption, arguing that it gives insufficient attention to states‘ rights9 and 
 
 
 
5
  Indeed, this happened.  See Nora Lockwood Tooher, Verdicts & Settlements January 16, 2006: 
Texas Jury Awards $253 Million in First Vioxx Trial, LAWYERS WEEKLY USA, Jan. 16, 2006, available 
at 2006 WLNR 23714535 (―Since the Aug. 19 verdict [in the Ernst case] Merck has evened the score by 
winning a defense verdict in the second Vioxx trial, and a third trial ended in a hung jury, with all but 
one of the 12 jurors supporting [Merck] . . . .  The stakes in the first wave of trials are enormous, with 
more than 9,000 Vioxx cases pending in state and federal courts.‖).  
6
  See Richard Epstein, Rule of Law: Ambush in Angleton, POINT OF LAW, Aug. 22, 2005, 
http://www.pointoflaw.com/columns/archives/001482.php (arguing that the implicit verdict in the origi-
nal Ernst case, and subsequent cases, was to ―shut down the entire quest for new medical therapies‖). 
7
  See, e.g., 18 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER‘S EDITION § 43:83 (2008) (summarizing the National 
Highway and Traffic Safety Administration‘s preemption provision, which bars certain common law tort 
actions for failure to meet minimum standards set forth by the Administration). 
8
  See, e.g., Thomas Ginsberg, Litigation Inoculation, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 9, 2006, at E1, availa-
ble at 2006 WLNR 11813379 (discussing ―the Bush [A]dministration‘s efforts to rein in claims against 
pharmaceutical companies‖); Myron Levin & Alan C. Miller, Industries Get Quiet Protection from 
Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, at 1, available at 2006 WLNR 6961228 (―[T]he Bush 
[A]dministration is providing industries with an unprecedented degree of protection at the expense of an 
individual‘s right to sue and a state‘s right to regulate.‖); With Help from Kessler, Waxman Mounts As-
sault on FDA Preemption, FDA WK., May 16, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 9277647 (discussing 
Congressman Waxman‘s questions about ―why FDA has so aggressively stepped up its preemption ar-
guments under the Bush [A]dministration‖). 
9
  See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
695, 699 (2008) (―The institutional focus of agencies makes them particularly ill-suited to consider state 
autonomy to regulate or federalism concerns.‖); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional 
Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 756 (2008) (―Even when directed by presidential executive order to 
consider the federalism implications of their actions, agencies have generally sought to avoid such an 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1768 
that it is an unprincipled grouping together of federal choices to set a regu-
latory ―floor‖ with what is effectively a ―ceiling.‖10  They also make the 
claim that the need for this kind of ex post regulation demonstrates the li-
mited ability of the FDA and other agencies to ensure optimum levels of 
safety.11   
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has taken several preemption cases in 
the last decade,12 including most recently Wyeth v. Levine, a case that left 
the door open for plaintiffs like Mrs. Ernst to continue to complain about 
drug companies‘ failure to warn about possible harm that could result from 
using their products.13  And the Democratic Congress, led by Representative 
Henry Waxman, is considering bills that would roll back some of the Su-
preme Court‘s more restrictive preemption jurisprudence.14 
Both sides in this debate, though, share a common but unexamined as-
sumption: that the purpose of state tort law is to act as a regulatory device.15  
Just as the FDA decides when a drug is ready for market and what warnings 
ought to accompany it, state tort law supplements that regulatory function 
by putting a price on the harm the drug inflicts.  The threat of lawsuits 
forces the drug company to internalize the costs of potential harm16 and 
                                                                                                                           
obligation.‖); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 870 (2008) (arguing 
that because the states do not elect or select members of federal administrative agencies, ―[a]gency ac-
tion . . . evades both the political and the procedural safeguards of federalism‖). 
10
  See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Dis-
tinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007) (arguing that the choice between setting a regulatory floor as 
opposed to a ceiling has very different institutional implications). 
11
  See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 380–84 (2007) (arti-
culating the importance of ―ex post accountability‖ in the U.S. regulatory regime); Carl Tobias, FDA 
Regulatory Compliance Reconsidered, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1009 (2008) (―Limited resources and 
authority may prevent the FDA from being an effective arbiter of optimal, rather than minimal, safety 
. . . .  For example, the FDA may approve a new drug before it receives thorough experimental data 
proving the drug is safe and efficacious because the agency depends substantially on manufacturer in-
formation and is pressured to certify pharmaceuticals quickly.‖); see also Peter Barton Hutt, The State of 
Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008) (describing the FDA 
as ―an agency with expanded responsibilities, stagnant resources, and the consequent inability to imple-
ment or enforce its statutory mandates‖). 
12
  See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (holding that the preemption clause of 
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006), bars tort claims challenging the 
safety or effectiveness of medical devices approved by the FDA).  
13
  See 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).  
14
  See Carter Wood, Preemption: The Legislative Undermining Under Way, POINT OF LAW, July 8, 
2008, http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2008/07/preemption.php (discussing the Medical Device 
Safety Act, H.R. 6381, 110th Cong. (2008), as ―[b]eing sold as overturning [Riegel]‖). 
15
  The implicit tension in Supreme Court opinions between those who assume that this is the case, 
as opposed to those who believe that tort law serves a function related to compensation or justice, is ob-
served in Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 449, 459–71 (2008).  See also Richard Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law 
Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 2 n.8 (2006) (citing Sharkey, supra). 
16
  See Richard A. Epstein, A Welcome Revolution, THE NAT‘L L. J., Feb. 6, 2006, available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080315100638/http://www.law.uchicago.edu/epstein-fda-delays.html 
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make a more accurate assessment about whether the drug‘s benefits suffi-
ciently outweigh its costs.  Anticipating litigation, the drug company might 
conduct more clinical trials beforehand or provide more robust warnings 
than the FDA alone requires.   
But what if this is not the purpose or function of state tort law?  Cer-
tainly, one effect of state tort law may be to encourage caution in the design, 
manufacturing, and marketing of potentially hazardous products, but is that 
really the purpose or function of state tort law?  Its raison d'être?  As Ri-
chard Nagareda has put it in the context of medical devices, ―one might say 
that it is the dominant scholarly account of tort law itself as an arm of regu-
lation . . . that has spawned the conflicting federal and state commands that 
support preemption here.‖17  
If we are going to preempt—that is, eliminate—state tort law in a va-
riety of circumstances, then we ought to have an answer to these questions: 
What exactly are we preempting?  What does it do?  Why is it there? 
Indeed, the same existential question that is now critical to the preemp-
tion concerns before all three branches of government in Washington ought 
to be at the core of the tort-reform debates in the state capitals.  But the 
question is rarely asked. 
We are perhaps now at the tail end of a wave of changes to tort law, 
commonly grouped under the banner of ―tort reform,‖ enacted by the legis-
latures and the judiciary.  These changes, occurring primarily in the last 
decade, followed periods of reform during the 1980s and early 1990s.18  In-
deed, the damages cap which reduced Mrs. Ernst‘s verdict was a product of 
such a tort-reform effort in Texas.  No doubt as this wave recedes, another 
will crest in the not too distant future.  Others have ably looked at the pre-
                                                                                                                           
(discussing the detrimental effects of tort lawsuits on the availability of drugs on the market); Amanda 
Erickson, Critics Blast Feds‟ Legal Shields for Manufacturers, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 2008, at C5, availa-
ble at http://web.archive.org/web/20080629100754/http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ 
chi-lawsuit-protection-bdjun29,0,5381352.story (quoting Ted Frank, an American Enterprise Institute 
fellow, stating that ―liability-happy lawyers have put companies and designers in a ‗damned if you do, 
damned if you don‘t‘ situation‖). 
17
  See Nagareda, supra note 15, at 15.  See also id. at 37 (noting that the dominant scholarly account 
of tort law ―emphasizes the capacity of tort litigation to serve as an occasion for regulatory policy mak-
ing by judges and juries‖ (citing John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 
521–37 (2003))).  
18
  See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 437, 470 (2006).  
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cise nature and effects of these periods of tort reform,19 though more empir-
ical research remains to be done.20   
But despite these efforts on the state and federal level, spanning a 
range of substantive and procedural aspects of tort law, we have proceeded 
with no answer to the question, as one scholar has put it, ―what are we re-
forming?‖21  This Article asks that same question, in slightly narrower 
terms: What is tort law for?  My aim in this Article is to turn to legal theory 
for help with these real-world dilemmas.22  
The strategy of the Article is as follows: after briefly surveying the 
landscape of contemporary tort theory, I focus in Part I on the traditional 
conception of tort law as individual justice that has been revived in recent 
years.  After reviewing the problems that have been raised with the most 
prominent of these individual-justice accounts, ―corrective justice‖ theories, 
I turn to a promising challenger in the individual-justice camp: ―civil re-
course‖ theory, which sees tort law as a means for empowering individuals 
to seek redress against those who have wronged them.   
Civil recourse theory has an advantage over corrective justice in its fit 
with the structure, concepts, and doctrine of American tort law.  But it 
seems to lack a morally appealing norm at its core.  Indeed, critics such as 
John Finnis have charged that it seems to smack of vengeance, and treats 
such an impulse as morally worthy.23  Though the civil recourse theorists—
John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky—have pointed to reasons justifying 
a law of civil recourse, they have thus far stopped short of providing a ro-
bust normative justification for such a social institution.24   
This Article seeks to provide such a justification.  It does so by break-
ing down the normative case for civil recourse into three parts: first, why a 
victim of an accidental harm is entitled to resent the tortfeasor such that 
 
 
 
19
  See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg & Joel M. Schumm, Judicial Policy and Quantitative Research: 
Indiana‟s Statute of Limitations for Medical Practitioners, 31 IND. L. REV. 1051 (1998); Thomas A. Ea-
ton & Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation in Georgia and Reflections on Tort Reform, 
30 GA. L. REV. 627 (1996); David A. Hyman et al., Estimating The Effect of Damage Caps in Medical 
Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 355 (2009), available at https://ojs.hup. 
harvard.edu/index.php/jla/article/view/16/39.  
20
  Such research is beyond the scope of this paper. 
21
  John C.P. Goldberg, What Are We Reforming? Tort Theory‟s Place in Debates over Malpractice 
Reform, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1075 (2006) [hereinafter Goldberg, What Are We Reforming?]. 
22
  This is not the first, and will no doubt not be the last, article on the topic.  Indeed, I do not try to 
invent a new theory here, but attempt to make a modest contribution to existing theories and debates and 
take as a virtue that this Article builds on the work of others.  
23
  See infra text accompanying notes 80–81. 
24
  This may well be in part a result of their interpretive methodology.  They have explained that 
they see the first step in analyzing tort law as understanding it from the ―inside,‖ as judges who must 
decide cases do; therefore, for them, following the perspective of a common law judge, ―the question of 
whether there is an adequate normative justification for tort law has not been front and center.‖  John 
C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 364–65 
n.2 (2005) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents]. 
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second, she is morally justified in ―acting against‖ that tortfeasor in some 
fashion, and third, is given access to a state-sponsored mechanism (tort law) 
for doing so.   
These first two steps are the moral norms at the heart of civil recourse 
theory and are addressed in Part II.  Relying in part on recent work in moral 
philosophy, particularly by Stephen Darwall, I explicate the appeal of these 
norms.  Then in Part III, I consider how the third step—justifying the pre-
cise role of the state—can be understood by translating Darwall‘s moral 
norm into a political or social ideal of equality.  Part IV addresses some ob-
jections to this account, and then I conclude.  
Though my focus is on civil recourse theory, I think this discussion can 
illuminate the normative appeal of a broader set of individual-justice theo-
ries of tort law.  In this way, I aim to provide an initial response to those 
who would eliminate tort law through preemption or significantly curtail it 
through ―reform‖ efforts.  In response to the practical and theoretical ques-
tion of what tort law is for, I answer that it provides a vehicle for individu-
als to bring about justice, and in doing so, vindicates the notion of a 
community of equals who are answerable to one another and expected to 
treat one another with equal respect. 
Whether or not such an institution is worth having, in light of its costs 
and effect on other social goals, is for Congress, state legislatures, and citi-
zens to decide.  But that is what is at stake. 
I. TORTS AS INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE: THE SEARCH FOR A MORAL NORM 
AND POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION 
What is tort law for?  In this Part, I first give a very brief sketch of the 
state of tort theory.  Then I focus on the search for a morally appealing 
norm and the political justification for an institution of ―corrective justice,‖ 
the leading individual-justice theory, as well as the theory of civil recourse.  
I look at the reasons that the recourse theorists have put forward thus far for 
having a law of civil recourse, but conclude that they need to go further in 
their normative justification, a task I begin to undertake in Parts II and III.   
A. The State of Tort Theory: A Thumbnail Sketch  
Today, tort scholars tend to give one of three accounts of the purpose 
of tort law: (1) individual justice; (2) compensation for accidental injuries; 
or (3) it serves a variety of public policy goals at once, including economic 
efficiency, deterrence of risky activity, injury compensation, spreading the 
loss associated with injuries, and even social justice.25  The second an-
swer—compensation for accidental injuries—faces serious challenges be-
cause tort law does not always succeed in achieving that goal, leaving many 
 
 
 
25
  For a more thorough account of the different tort theories, see generally John C.P. Goldberg, 
Twentieth Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003). 
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seriously injured individuals without compensation commensurate to the 
harm suffered.  The failure to adequately achieve adequate compensation, 
along with the lack of historical evidence indicating that this was tort law‘s 
intended purpose, seriously undercuts the plausibility of compensation as an 
explanatory theory of what tort law is for. 
The third explanation—what John Goldberg has called ―congenial plu-
ralism‖—suffers from a number of problems.26  As with compensation, no 
historical evidence demonstrates that these public policy goals motivated 
the development and design of tort law.  More problematic, public policy 
goals like deterrence and loss spreading often conflict—how should one de-
cide which goals take precedence over the others in a particular case or area 
of doctrine?  The congenial pluralists‘ answer—that one tries to balance all 
the goals in any given case—does not provide much comfort. 
The individual-justice approach was the most disfavored of these for 
most of the twentieth century.27  Most scholars saw the idea of torts-as-
individual-justice as a relic of history, rooted in its origin as a replacement 
for private vengeance.28  Historically, of course, the ―individual justice‖ ex-
planation has the strongest pedigree, and in the last few decades, this expla-
nation has made a comeback in tort theory through the work of George 
Fletcher and Richard Epstein in the early 1970s, and more recently, Jules 
Coleman, Ernest Weinrib, and others.29  At the same time, economic effi-
ciency as a descriptive account of tort law—advanced by Richard Posner in 
the early 1970s—has largely fallen by the wayside, abandoned even by the 
most ardent proponents of law and economics, who focus on the normative 
 
 
 
26
  Id. at 579–80. 
27
  As George Fletcher put it, ―The fashionable questions of the time are instrumentalist: What social 
value does the rule of liability further in this case?  Does it advance a desirable goal, such as compensa-
tion, deterrence, risk-distribution, or minimization of accident costs?‖  George P. Fletcher, Fairness and 
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 538 (1972) (footnote omitted). 
28
  See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED & DAVID ROSENBERG, MAKING TORT LAW: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE 
AND WHO SHOULD DO IT, 26–27 (2003) (explaining that they find it ―incomprehensible‖ that the tort 
system would ―assert a moral mission of doing ‗individual justice,‘‖ thereby increasing the cost of acci-
dents). 
29
  See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992) (explaining tort law as concerned 
with identifying whether there are instances of ―wrongful loss‖ where a wrongdoer ought to compensate 
the victim for the harm caused); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) (describing cor-
rective justice as a self-contained practice where those who behave wrongfully discharge their duty of 
repair by compensating those they have harmed); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) (outlining a libertarian theory of tort law where the act of causing harm to 
another, even with without fault, is ground for compensation); Fletcher, supra note 27 (explaining both 
negligence and strict liability as expressions of a single reciprocity principle).  Other leading corrective 
justice theorists include Arthur Ripstein and Stephen Perry.  See, e.g., ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (1999); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA 
L. REV. 449 (1992). 
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aspect of using economic efficiency as the primary dimension of value for 
evaluating how tort law should be.30   
No single theory dominates the field.  Most scholars think corrective 
justice—the leading individual-justice theory—is more consistent than oth-
er accounts with the ―internal point of view‖—that of lawyers and judges—
but that it is too abstract and indeterminate to help make doctrinal choices 
or decide cases.31  And so many scholars fall back to some kind of pluralist 
notion of tort law serving the goals of compensation, deterrence, and other 
public policy aims, with others disputing the need or desirability for a 
theory at all.32  However, without a theory of what this area of law is sup-
posed to accomplish, it is difficult to have a meaningful discussion about 
how well it is functioning and how it might do better—the kind of discus-
sion that is critical in today‘s preemption and tort-reform debates. 
B. Corrective Justice‟s Justification Challenge 
Corrective justice, a theory which focuses on wrongful conduct or loss, 
seeks to restore the equilibrium that has been violated by a person who has 
wrongfully harmed another.33  By injuring another wrongfully, the injurer 
acquires a ―duty of repair,‖ which is fulfilled through tort law.  The very 
―bipolar‖ structure of tort law—litigation is between a private plaintiff and 
defendant—helps illustrate what is normatively important about tort law, 
the relationship between these private parties, as opposed to a public pur-
pose like regulating risky activity.34  And the most common remedy in 
tort—the payment of money damages, equivalent to the magnitude of the 
 
 
 
30
  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
1044–45 (2001) (―Initially, we note that most authors who advance notions of corrective justice are 
making positive—that is, descriptive—arguments; in particular, they suggest that corrective justice is the 
principle that is most consistent with common law tort doctrine.  To this extent, their claims about cor-
rective justice have no direct relevance to our undertaking because our thesis is entirely normative, being 
concerned with the proper manner of assessing legal policy.  (Indeed, we do not assert that the law fully 
reflects the prescriptions of welfare economics, and we argue . . . that the law is influenced by notions of 
fairness, perhaps including corrective justice.).‖) (footnote omitted). 
31
  Even some corrective justice theorists appear to agree with this.  See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Cor-
relativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 107, 158 (2001) (―[F]or all its theoretical sophistication, the exploration of corrective justice by tort 
theorists has involved a comparatively narrow set of legal doctrines.‖).   
32
  To be fair, some scholars seem to think that a pluralist notion of an area of the law is better than a 
―monistic‖ one.  See, e.g., Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky‟s Civil Recourse Theory, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1560 (2006) (―We can see what is distinctive about a tree, but we cannot 
reduce this to a unitary notion.  Indeed, why would we want to do so?‖). 
33
  The idea of an equilibrium restored by corrective justice comes from ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN 
ETHICS, BOOK 5.5, 74–76 (T. Irwin trans., 1999).  
34
  See Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 494–526 (1989); see al-
so JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL 
THEORY 13–24 (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE] (referring to the ―bilateral‖ 
structure of tort law). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1774 
victim‘s injury—serves to restore the equilibrium disturbed by the wrong or 
injury.35  
While corrective justice theory is intuitively appealing, its proponents 
have struggled to identify a normative justification for having such an insti-
tution.  For example, although Jules Coleman, a leading corrective justice 
theorist, has powerfully developed the legal norm of corrective justice over 
the last three decades, he has failed to identify a norm rooted in moral 
theory which the legal norm aims to vindicate.36   
One possibility is that corrective justice vindicates the moral principle: 
―Don't take what is not yours.‖37  Another possibility is that corrective jus-
tice serves to determine and enforce the just distribution of risk in society.38  
Still another possibility is that the legal norm of corrective justice is a 
―second-best‖ solution of how to discharge the moral duty of reasonable 
care when it has already been breached.  In other words, if you violate your 
duty of care with respect to another and harm him, the duty does not go 
away.  You can no longer try to avoid causing him harm because you have 
already done so, but you can, as a second-best solution, pay him compensa-
tory damages in order to discharge that duty.39 
Central to this justificatory challenge has been determining how cor-
rective justice relates to distributive justice.40  Specifically, the challenge 
goes something like this: if the initial entitlements which individuals hold 
are themselves distributively unjust—because of the accident of birth, for 
example—why would we have a system of ―justice‖ to return to said en-
titlements?41  Reinforcing distributively unjust positions seems an odd task 
 
 
 
35
  See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 135–36 (1995) (―[T]he defendant‘s liability 
to the plaintiff rectifies both the normative gain and the normative loss in a single bipolar operation.‖). 
36
  Indeed, Coleman does not think that identifying such a norm is his burden under the methodolog-
ical approach he favors.  See COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 34, at 4–5 n.4 (distin-
guishing his approach from that of Ronald Dworkin, who would look to a moral norm or principle); see 
also id. at 5 (―The defensibility of corrective justice as a moral ideal is . . . independent of its role in ex-
plaining tort law.‖). 
37
  See Arthur Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, 1 J. TORT L. Iss. 2, Art. 3, at 11 (2007), 
available at http://www.bepress.com/jtl/vol1/iss2/art3 (―You can use your means, but not mine . . . .‖).  
Ripstein is relying on the Rawlsian idea of ―primary goods‖ here.  See Arthur Ripstein, The Division of 
Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1812–13 (2004). 
38
  See Tony Honore, The Morality of Tort Law—Questions and Answers, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 83–84 (David Owen ed. 1997); RIPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 48–93 (de-
scribing tort law as a way of determining ―a fair division of risks‖).  
39
  See Arthur Ripstein, As If It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1972, 1984–
86 (2007) (discussing how ―money reverses the deprivation‖ of one‘s means).   
40
  There is a significant body of literature on the moral norm underwriting corrective justice and the 
relationship between corrective justice and distributive justice; I do not intend to contribute to this body 
nor thoroughly canvass it here.  My aim is simply to show that the moral norm is on shaky founda-
tions—that besides the other criticisms, one aspect that has prevented corrective justice theory from get-
ting more traction is the lack of a compelling justification for such a system.  
41
  This point has been made by many who criticize corrective justice, including Hanoch Dagan, The 
Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 MICH. L. REV. 138 (1999). 
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for the state to undertake.  If a waitress making $25,000 a year drives too 
fast because she is late for work and rear-ends Donald Trump, why should 
the state have a mechanism for Trump to coerce the waitress into paying 
him damages?   
One strategy is to argue that the moral norm behind corrective justice 
is to protect a distributively just set of entitlements.  If the distributive jus-
tice criteria are satisfied, then the moral norm of corrective justice comes 
into play as a principle of political morality that has been translated into the 
legal realm through tort law.42  Coleman suggests that this principle of polit-
ical morality depends on ―what is required to secure an underlying distribu-
tion of holdings,‖ including what is necessary for individuals to ―pursue 
lives of their own choosing.‖43  But in a world where underlying distributive 
justice is hard to find, the legal norm and practice of corrective justice may 
be difficult to justify. 
C. Enter Civil Recourse Theory 
In the last fifteen years, Benjamin Zipursky and John Goldberg have 
developed an alternative theory of tort law as individual justice.44  Their 
theory identifies the central feature of tort law as the state‘s provision of a 
right to recourse to those who have been the victims of a legal wrong.  
Drawing on Blackstone and Locke, they find support in history and political 
 
 
 
42
  Jules Coleman uses this strategy in Political Morality and Tort Law (unpublished and undated 
manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/yclp/papers.html.  To be sure, Coleman refers to his 
thoughts in this unpublished manuscript as ―very preliminary and tentative as I am by no means certain 
of the views expressed or of the arguments offered in their support.‖  Id. at 1. 
43
  Id. at 9. 
44
  Civil recourse theory was first introduced by Zipursky in Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the 
Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse].  
Shortly afterwards, Goldberg and Zipursky published John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The 
Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998), which largely focused on the relationality of 
duty but also asserted that a relational duty approach should go hand in hand with a civil recourse theory 
of tort law.  Goldberg and Zipursky have extended this joint relationality-and-recourse approach in sev-
eral joint articles since 1998.  See Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents, supra note 24; John C.P. Goldberg 
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. 
L. REV. 657, 724 (2001); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law From the In-
ternal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563 (2006) [hereinafter 
Goldberg & Zipursky, Internal Point of View]; John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding 
Duty: How Attending to Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can 
Improve Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 329 (2006); John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123 (2007) [hereinafter Goldberg 
& Zipursky, Moral Luck]; John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. 
REV. 1625 (2002).  Goldberg and Zipursky have developed civil recourse theory separately in, especial-
ly: John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for 
the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) [hereinafter Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort 
Law]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 718–21 (2003) 
[hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse]; and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002).   
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theory for the notion of an individual‘s right to redress a wrong against him 
or her.45  In a series of articles, they demonstrate how this principle of ―civil 
recourse‖ can explain a variety of doctrines within torts better than econom-
ic or corrective justice accounts.46 
In many ways, their work builds on the corrective justice theories of 
Jules Coleman and particularly Ernest Weinrib, and these theorists‘ criti-
ques of economic accounts of tort.  But Zipursky and Goldberg have several 
critiques of corrective justice theory that helped form the basis for civil re-
course theory.47   
First, they argue that the theory of corrective justice inaccurately indi-
cates that there is a ―duty of repair.‖  Rather, they say, there is no affirma-
tive duty to pay anything in the absence of a lawsuit.  If the lawsuit is 
successful, there is a liability, not an affirmative duty.48  Second, corrective 
justice theory does not account for countless tort cases where wrongs by de-
fendants do not lead to liability.  These cases, Zipursky argues, are ex-
plained by a series of ―substantive standing‖ requirements that specify 
when certain classes of victims can successfully sue particular defendants.49  
Finally, recourse theory criticizes corrective justice for treating compensa-
tory ―make-whole‖ damages as the only and essential remedy in torts, thus 
conflating the issues of tort liability and remedy.  Rather, there are a variety 
of remedies awarded in tort, including injunctions and punitive damages.50  
A key innovation of Goldberg and Zipursky is their explanation of how 
an individual‘s right to recourse is more consistent with the structure of tort 
law than corrective justice or economic accounts.  Under our system of tort 
law, individual victims decide whether or not to bring lawsuits against their 
injurers.51  If tort law was really about compensation for injuries, deterrence 
of risky activity, or correcting a disequilibrium created by harm to another, 
then it is not clear why the state should not undertake these tasks, just as it 
prosecutes crimes.52  However, Goldberg and Zipursky believe that the ab-
 
 
 
45
  See, e.g., Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 532–58; Zipursky, Phi-
losophy of Private Law, supra note 44, at 637–42. 
46
  See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 697–98 (arguing that his ―model of rights, 
wrongs, and recourse . . . aims to provide a superior account of the structure of tort law to that offered by 
both law and economics and corrective justice theory‖). 
47
  The piece that most specifically targets corrective justice theory is id. at 709–33. 
48
  Id. at 718–21. 
49
  Id. at 714–18. 
50
  See id. at 710–13.  For a summary of these critiques, see Jason M. Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 1749, 1785–86 (2007).    
51
  Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 754 (―[C]orrective justice theory itself misses the true 
structure of tort law.  Tort law is a system in which individuals are empowered to bring rights of actions 
against those who have committed torts—legal wrongs—against them.‖). 
52
  Goldberg, What Are We Reforming?, supra note 21, at 1076 (―To posit that tort law is a system 
for deterring undesirable conduct and compensating injury victims is, essentially, to think of tort law as 
a branch of the administrative state.‖). 
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sence of a Department of Accidental Harm53 in our legal system indicates 
that perhaps there is some reason other than administrative convenience or 
historical accident for privately initiated lawsuits that can help illuminate 
tort law‘s normative structure.54  This reason, they conclude, is that the 
principal aim of tort law is to provide individuals with the right to redress 
wrongs, not the correction of harms or deterrence of risky activity.55   
One response to civil recourse theory has been to shrug it off as simply 
a dressed-up version of corrective justice.  The historian John Witt says that 
some literature now ―purports to offer a different basis for tort in what is 
styled civil redress,‖ but he claims it is ―effectively the same‖ as corrective 
justice.56  From a slightly different perspective, fellow individual justice 
theorist Alan Calnan scolds Goldberg and Zipursky as ―corrective justice 
‗insiders‘‖ who have turned on their theoretical friends.57  Indeed, Goldberg 
and Zipursky have acknowledged their sympathy for and intellectual debt to 
the corrective justice accounts, and Goldberg includes both recourse theory 
and corrective justice in the family of ―individual justice‖ theories in tort.58  
But the theories are different in important ways. 
Corrective justice theory takes as the fundamental feature of tort law 
the payment of money damages from the defendant to the plaintiff if liabili-
ty is established.59  This monetary transfer serves to restore the equilibrium 
that has been upset by the harm that the wrongdoer has inflicted upon the 
person harmed.60  As one leading corrective justice theorist puts it, the pay-
ment of money damages is intended to give back the resources that the in-
jurer has taken from the victim so that the victim can use those resources 
towards her own ends, as we can each do in a liberal society.61 
For recourse theory, though, it is the entitlement to the claim itself—
the ―avenue of recourse‖—that is the ―animating idea‖ behind tort law.62  
Goldberg puts it this way: ―The core claim of redress theory is that tort 
law‘s distinctiveness resides in conferring on individuals (and entities) a 
 
 
 
53
  Goldberg uses a similar example called ―The Department of Safety and Relief.‖  Id. 
54
  Id.  
55
  Id. at 1077 (arguing that a superior tort theory is a ―wrongs-and-redress view‖).  
56
  John Fabian Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of Accidents, 1 J. TORT 
L. 1, 12 (2007).  Interestingly, Jane Stapleton‘s recent critique of recourse theory, though containing 
several grounds, does not include this one, acknowledging that recourse theory is an advance over both 
law and economics and corrective justice theory on the metric of fit.  See Stapleton, supra note 32. 
57
  Alan Calnan, In Defense of the Liberal Justice Theory of Torts: A Reply to Professors Goldberg 
and Zipursky, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1023, 1024 (2005) [hereinafter Calnan, In Defense of the Liber-
al Justice Theory] (charging that ―these corrective justice ‗insiders‘ have not just challenged the theory 
they claim to support, but have virtually left it for dead‖). 
58
  See Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort Theory, supra note 25, at 570–78. 
59
  Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 707, 710. 
60
  Id. at 695. 
61
  See Ripstein, As If It Had Never Happened, supra note 39, at 1971–72. 
62
  Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents, supra note 24, at 403. 
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power to pursue a legal claim alleging that she (or it) has suffered an injury 
flowing from a legal wrong to her by another.‖63  To use H.L.A. Hart‘s dis-
tinction, it is the ―power-conferring‖ rather than the ―duty-imposing‖ aspect 
of tort law that defines it and bestows its distinctive character.64 
In part, this is a dispute about the methodology of legal theory—
specifically, what are the salient features of an area of law that must be ex-
plained.65  For all corrective justice theorists, the bipolar structure of tort 
law—that the injured brings a lawsuit against the injurer—is itself an in-
stantiation of this principle of corrective justice, tying together the ―doer‖ 
and the ―sufferer,‖ to use Aristotle‘s terms.66  But for some corrective jus-
tice theorists, particularly Jules Coleman, the particular institutional me-
chanisms used in tort law—where private lawsuits are brought by victims at 
their discretion—is historically and culturally contingent.  In other words, 
for Coleman and others, a proper descriptive theory of tort law need not ex-
plain the structure of the institution of tort law itself.67   
Coleman makes his view of the contingency of privately initiated law-
suits quite clear in a recent paper, responding to the recourse theorists‘ cri-
tique by explaining that society might respond to ―corrective injustice‖ by 
investing in a legal system that can identify such injustices.  Such a system 
might be structured logically through privately initiated lawsuits on the 
theory that the victim has the greatest incentive to develop the evidence to 
help identify such injustices (and enforce the duty to repair).  This system 
would also have the benefit of acknowledging a ―special claim‖ on behalf 
of the victims.68  But in explaining this, Coleman makes clear that our par-
ticular system is not essential to vindicating the normative principles that 
tort law is designed to achieve.69 
Though the corrective justice theorists claim to take the structure of 
tort law seriously, the focus on the payment of damages as the mode of res-
toring normative equilibrium leads to serious questions about whether the 
system of privately initiated lawsuits has any place in corrective justice 
theory at all.70  Is there any reason why the state could not act as an Aristo-
telian schoolteacher, shaking her finger at the defendant, demanding that the 
defendant return the toys that he had improperly taken from the plaintiff?  
From a corrective justice theory perspective, the answer appears to be no.71  
 
 
 
63
  Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 605. 
64
  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 26–33 (2d ed. 1997) (introducing the distinction between 
these two kinds of rules).  
65
  See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 3–22 (1980).  
66
  WEINRIB, supra note 29, at 65.  
67
  Ripstein expresses this view as well, though Weinrib would disagree with this theory. 
68
  Coleman, supra note 42, at 10–11.  
69
  Id.  
70
  See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 716, 734–35. 
71
  See Coleman, supra note 42, at 9.   
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This is by no means a fatal strike, but a theory that can explain how the 
structure of the legal system is an instantiation of the normative principles 
undergirding that area of law has an advantage over one that does not.  In 
addition, such a theory can help explicate the difference between tort law 
and criminal law.72  Civil recourse theory has these advantages, as I will ex-
plain further below.73  
D. Recourse Theory‟s Need for Normative Justification 
Civil recourse theory has quickly become a serious challenger as an in-
terpretive theory of tort law, but it has also met with criticism.74  One criti-
cism is that the theory suffers, as the legal theorist John Finnis put it, from a 
lack of ―full-throated normative justification.‖75  Goldberg and Zipursky see 
their primary task as interpretive, and as a result, have mostly avoided the 
task of defending a law of ―civil recourse‖ as one that is worth having.76  
Finnis puts the challenge this way: ―[A]t its deepest level, this theory of civ-
 
 
 
72
  Indeed, Goldberg and Zipursky have made this point.  See Goldberg & Zipursky, Unrealized 
Torts, supra note 44, at 1642–46. 
73
  To be sure, it might seem odd to criticize corrective justice for not taking the structure of tort law 
seriously enough, as it has been itself criticized for taking structure too seriously.  See, e.g., Kenneth W. 
Simons, Justification in Private Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 698 (1996) (reviewing WEINRIB, supra note 
29).  Indeed, corrective justice improved upon economic accounts significantly by explaining certain as-
pects of the structure of tort law: why the defendant must pay damages to a particular victim (as opposed 
to a general public fund to be distributed to victims) and why there is a causation requirement in tort.  
See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 382 (1992); WEINRIB, supra note 29, at 132–33.  But it 
does not explain—as civil recourse theory does—why equilibrium is brought about by a private lawsuit 
initiated at the victim‘s discretion, given that this state of affairs leads to underlitigation on certain legi-
timate claims, leaving much disequilibrium uncorrected.  Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 
752–53. 
74
  See generally Calnan, In Defense of the Liberal Justice Theory, supra note 57 (criticizing re-
course theory and offering an alternative ―liberal‖ justice theory in its place); Jane Stapleton, Evaluating 
Goldberg and Zipursky‟s Civil Recourse Theory, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1562 (2006) (providing 
reasons why the recourse theory project was ―unnecessary,‖ ―overblown in its claims, awkward and in-
convenient in application,‖ and ―internally incoherent in its account of the ‗guidance‘ it claims that the 
law of torts sends out‖). 
75
  John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 56 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).  Jane 
Stapleton makes a version of this point as well.  See Stapleton, supra note 74, at 1562 (arguing that the 
civil recourse theorists‘ ―project is actually a normative one, namely to persuade lawyers to choose the 
conceptual arrangements they prefer,‖ and if the project were framed this way, the theory would get 
greater traction). 
76
  See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 735 (―In what follows, I attempt to explain the 
principle of civil recourse and to show how it illuminates the structure of tort law.  I will not attempt to 
justify this principle, except to the extent that explaining it will involve illuminating its intelligibility and 
normative appeal.‖); id. at 755 (―I have been cautious . . . to characterize my aims as interpretive and not 
normative.‖); Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 44, at 6 (―The account I offer is in-
tended to be a framework for a theory of tort law that is descriptive, not prescriptive. . . . I shall not be 
arguing that . . . the principle of civil recourse is morally correct.‖).  But see Goldberg, Constitutional 
Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 583 (offering an ―interpretive and normative argument‖).  
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il recourse fails by overlooking the radical dependence of descriptive or 
conceptual analysis on unrestricted critical engagement with issues of eval-
uation—with the normative truths which are the sole rational source of jus-
tifications (or condemnations).‖77  Finnis faults recourse theory for stopping 
short of a defense of the institution of tort law using ―principles‖ which we 
can reasonably judge ―to be justified.‖78   
In my view, Finnis is right: the theory will not gain sufficient traction 
without a more ―full-throated‖ justificatory defense.79  Without justification, 
it is open to critics to say, essentially: ―Tort law could not possibly be 
aimed at providing civil recourse to victims because that sounds like ven-
geance, and vengeance cannot be a legitimate exercise of the State‘s coer-
cive authority.‖  
Indeed, Finnis says that civil recourse theory would be rejected by the 
classical theory of natural law.  He explains: ―At its root recourse theory 
treats as worthy the emotional impulse of the victim of wrongdoing to ‗get 
even,‘ by ‗act[ing] against‘—having recourse against—the rights-
violator.‖80  He argues that this violates the ―true‖ natural law principle, ―do 
not answer injury with injury.‖81 
 
 
 
77
  FINNIS, supra note 65, at 59. 
78
  See id. (italics in original). 
79
  Zipursky himself uses a deeply interpretive jurisprudential approach that he calls ―pragmatic con-
ceptualism,‖ which resists the separation of the descriptive and normative that Finnis and other legal 
theorists typically use.  He describes the approach in part this way:  
Pragmatic conceptualism suggests that a variety of concepts and principles in tort law constitute 
that area of the law.  Identifying those concepts and principles is a large part of offering a legal 
theory.  However, a closely related (and sometimes inseparable) part of legal theory is rendering 
the concepts and principles so identified intelligible from a normative point of view . . . . 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 472 (2000).  For a more com-
plete explanation of this jurisprudential approach, see id. at 474–78.  For a similar if distinct approach, 
see COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 34, at 3–12 & n.12 (describing the ―pragmatic 
method‖ of asking what principles are ―embodied‖ in a legal practice, and citing Zipursky, supra). 
80
  FINNIS, supra note 65, at 57 (italics and alterations in original) (quoting Zipursky, Rights, 
Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 44, at 85). 
81
  Id.  According to the jurisprudential approach laid out in Pragmatic Conceptualism, the recourse 
theorists are identifying the concepts and principles—such as a right to recourse—at work in tort law, 
and rendering them ―intelligible from a normative point of view.‖  Zipursky, supra note 79, at 472.  In 
order to do this, they rely in large part on Lockean social contract theory.  See, e.g., Goldberg, Constitu-
tional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 541–44 (explaining that Locke‘s social contract theory 
claims that ―victims of wrongs possess a natural right to reparations from wrongdoers, and that govern-
ment, as custodian of individuals‘ rights, owes it to them to provide a law of reparations‖); Zipursky, 
Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 735–37; Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, supra note 44, at 637–
44; Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 44, at 85–86 (discussing the fairness of provid-
ing an avenue of recourse using the ―language of social contract theory‖ (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 7–10 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 1980) (1690))).    
However, even if Goldberg and Zipursky are right about having said enough, from a normative point 
of view, to quell a certain kind of critique based on the unappealing nature of a set of vengeance-like 
principles allegedly at the basis of tort law, there is still an extraordinarily important question about 
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So it appears that recourse theory is stuck on the same problem pla-
guing its chief rival in the ―individual justice‖ camp, corrective justice: the 
lack of both a morally appealing norm and political justification for the 
state to underwrite this area of law.  
Goldberg and Zipursky do, in various places, point to reasons for hav-
ing a system of law that provides civil recourse in place of private ven-
geance, realizing that even the interpretive task is not complete or 
persuasive without an animating aim that is not only intelligible, but also 
normatively justified.  Their primary reasons are essentially twofold: (1) 
that tort law is a necessary component of an overall legal system that seeks 
to peaceably resolve disputes in order to prevent escalating cycles of ven-
geance;82 and (2) that as a matter of political theory, the state cannot take 
away individuals‘ rights to avenge wrongs done to them without providing 
a substitute.83   
This first argument concerning dispute resolution has the advantage of 
an accurate historical grounding: by all accounts, tort law originated from 
the King‘s attempt to create a monopoly on the use of force.  In place of 
private vengeance, the King created Writs, which enabled individuals to 
bring their claims to the courts.84  Indeed, this historical justification for tort 
law has been employed for centuries.85  But some scholars have questioned 
whether this normative justification is still appropriate in contemporary 
American society, particularly with the overwhelming majority of the tort 
system being made up of accidental injuries, not the assaults and batteries 
of yesteryear.86  Indeed, Oliver Wendell Holmes opened his influential The 
Common Law with precisely this argument.87   
If our legal system did not have tort law to provide redress for harm 
caused in an auto accident with a careless driver, then the likely result 
would be a more robust first-party insurance market, not increased violence 
to get revenge, according to this view.88  If supermarkets did not have liabil-
ity insurance to provide some measure of satisfaction to customers injured 
slipping on a wet floor, then the result might be the growth of websites or 
                                                                                                                           
whether the system is at the end of the day normatively justifiable.  I am starting to address that question 
in this Article. 
82
  See Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 602–03; Goldberg & Zipursky, 
Unrealized Torts, supra note 44, at 1641–44.  
83
  See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 736–37; Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, 
supra note 44, at 84. 
84
  See Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 538–41. 
85
  For more recent accounts, see Steven Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
68 (1991) (referring to the primary function of tort law as ―dispute resolution‖).  
86
  See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 63 (Quorum 
1989). 
87
  See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881). 
88
  See John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and 
the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 778–97 (2001) (discussing 
the development of first-party insurance as an alternative to tort law). 
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Consumer Reports rankings on the maintenance of the premises at different 
establishments, not injured customers smashing windows.  For this justifi-
cation, then, to provide a strong normative grounding for recourse theory, 
we would need more empirical evidence demonstrating the need for such a 
system in contemporary society.  
The other argument is that the state must provide a system of civil re-
course as a matter of political theory.  In Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, Zi-
pursky says that ―where the State forbids private vengeful retribution, 
fairness demands that an opportunity for redress be provided by the State.‖89  
He also refers to the law of civil recourse as allowing society to ―avoid[] the 
mayhem and crudeness of vengeful private retribution, but without the un-
fairness of leaving individuals powerless against invasions of their rights.‖90  
Both Zipursky and Goldberg rely heavily on John Locke‘s social contract 
theory,91 with Blackstone‘s Commentaries also playing a role in demonstrat-
ing that this idea is both familiar and rooted in American law.92  Goldberg 
makes a compelling case for the protection of a right to redress as a matter 
of constitutional theory, attempting to reinvigorate a notion of ―structural 
due process‖ that once protected such a right.93  
But if not constitutionally required, the reason why it would be unfair 
to fail to provide such a system is not entirely clear.94  In one sense, Zi-
pursky seems to be making a ―breach-of-contract‖ type argument based on 
a social contract framework.95  According to this view, in moving from the 
 
 
 
89
  Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 44, at 84.  
90
  Id. at 85.  According to Zipursky: ―The statement that one has a ‗right‘ to bring an action against 
a defendant is a way of saying that fairness demands that the state recognize an individual‘s privilege to 
proceed against the defendant for civil recourse.‖  Id. 
91
  See supra note 81. 
92
  See Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 545–59; Zipursky, Philosophy 
of Private Law, supra note 44, at 641–42.  
93
  See Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 531–68 (arguing that a ―right 
of redress‖ is embedded in the political and constitutional structure of the United States).  The ―structur-
al due process‖ phrase is taken from Lawrence Tribe.  See id. at 530 & n.18 (citing Laurence H. Tribe, 
Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975), but changing the usage to convey the 
idea that ―citizens enjoy rights to certain political institutions and bodies of law‖).  Besides looking 
backward to the understanding of early American elites, pre-Civil War state courts, Fourteenth Amend-
ment proponents, and the Supreme Court after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Goldberg also 
argues that ―[b]y identifying tort law‘s linkages to liberty, democracy, equality, limited government, and 
the rule of law, I aim to explain why even today courts and legislatures have reasons to take seriously 
the idea that our Federal Constitution includes a right to a law for the redress of wrongs.‖  Id. at 606. 
94
  Again, their interpretive methodology may lead the recourse theorists to resist answering this 
question in this way.  See Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 611 (arguing 
that ―a law for the redress of private wrongs is a basic component of our political regime‖). 
95
  See Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 44, at 85 (after making the fairness 
point, saying that ―if we wish, we can also frame this point in the language of social contract theory‖).  
For a fuller development of this framework, see Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, supra note 44, at 
637–44 (using ideas from Locke and Blackstone to develop the idea that in the case of individual 
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―state of nature‖ to civilized society, individuals give up their right to per-
sonally avenge wrongs done to them, and the state has a monopoly on 
force.96  Of course, the criminal law is the primary means by which the state 
fulfills its end of the bargain to properly take action against wrongdoers, but 
according to the recourse theorists‘ account, that is not enough.  A system 
of civil recourse is also necessary to provide individuals with a mechanism 
for ―getting even‖ in circumstances that the criminal law does not cover.97  
As Zipursky puts it, ―while the state takes away the liberty of private retri-
bution, it offers a right to civil redress in its place.‖98 
But as the recourse theorists are well aware, social contract theory is 
merely an expository device, meant to help illuminate the respective roles 
of the individual and the state in a liberal society, but it cannot do the ne-
cessary normative work to justify the respective responsibilities of these 
parties.99  That is, we need to know why fairness demands a system of civil 
recourse that is independent of the ―terms‖ of the social contract itself.  We 
need an affirmative explanation of the appropriate role of the state and the 
―place‖ of tort law in a liberal society.100   
I suspect that we lack an adequate affirmative account in part because 
it seems normatively unattractive to defend the desire to ―act against‖ 
another.101  In fact, Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge that their concep-
tion of recourse may appear ―archaic or barbaric because it links torts to 
vengeance or retaliation.‖102   
Indeed, to say (as Zipursky does) that it is unfair to forbid private retal-
iation without providing an adequate substitute through law is necessarily a 
validation of vengeful feelings.  To validate vengeful feelings does seem 
―barbaric.‖103  In a sense, this theory suggests that if a speeding driver rear-
                                                                                                                           
wrongs, ―the rejection of purely private aggression is replaced by the empowerment of private parties to 
alter the legal status of wrongdoers, through a civil process that includes the state‖ (italics omitted)). 
96
  Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 44, at 85–86. 
97
  Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 737. 
98
  Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 44, at 86.  See also Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort and Moral Luck, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 97, 110 
(2008) [hereinafter Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility] (―[A] central normative reason for hav-
ing a form of law like this is that the empowerment of private parties who have been wronged to an ave-
nue of recourse against the wrongdoer is part of a social contract, softening the force of the more general 
prohibition on retaliation against wrongdoers.‖). 
99
  Zipursky acknowledges this in Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, supra note 44, at 642 (―The 
Lockian social contract metaphor cannot take much pressure, as sympathetic critics from Hume to 
Rawls have pointed out.‖).  
100
  Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, supra note 37, at 9. 
101
  A version of this ―normatively unattractive‖ argument was made in Emily Sherwin, Compensa-
tion and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387 (2003).  Another reason may simply be that their inter-
pretive methodology of ―pragmatic conceptualism‖ resists a clean separation between the descriptive 
and normative. 
102
  Goldberg & Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, supra note 44, at 1644. 
103
  See id.  
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ends you, you are justified and acting as a reasonable person would in civi-
lized society to want to punch him in the face. 
Shying away from fully justifying this conclusion, though, is a mistake.  
Indeed, since Finnis‘s justification challenge, Goldberg and Zipursky have 
moved in a somewhat more normative direction, though still within their 
deeply interpretive methodology.  Specifically, they have discussed the role 
of tort law in developing ―loci of responsibility‖ among individuals as a 
possible justification or purpose for tort law.104  In a piece authored alone, 
Goldberg also points to ideals of equality in American political theory gen-
erally and in the Fourteenth Amendment specifically as a justification for a 
law of civil recourse.105  In my view, the equality justification is more prom-
ising than the ―loci of responsibility,‖ but I will discuss both below when 
addressing the political justification for a state-sponsored system of civil re-
course in Part III. 
For now, I pick up below where Zipursky‘s fairness rationale leaves 
off: asking why we might be justified in having these resentful feelings, and 
why it might be unfair not to offer a substitute for private vengeance.  
Though I focus on civil recourse theory, the hope is that the discussion 
might contribute to thinking about corrective justice as well.  
II. THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF RECOURSE THEORY  
In this section, I start where Zipursky concluded in identifying the 
normative basis for the principle of civil recourse that, he argues, is at the 
 
 
 
104
  Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 608–10 (explaining how, ―[a]s a 
body of law that carves out these loci of responsibility, tort helps to maintain a version of civil society 
that is distinctively liberal‖); Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents, supra note 24, at 368; accord Goldberg 
& Zipursky, Internal Point of View, supra note 44, at 1564, 1575–77 (using H.L.A. Hart‘s account of the 
―internal aspect‖ of rules to bolster the notion of tort as a law of ―genuine duties‖ of conduct among in-
dividuals); Goldberg & Zipursky, Moral Luck, supra note 44, at 1151–57, 1164 (―[W]e have shown that 
the idea of responsibility within tort law meshes well with familiar and powerful everyday judgments 
about responsibility that are deeply embedded in social practices.‖). 
105
  See Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 607 (―As the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment understood, to render a person capable of suing (and being sued) for injuries 
suffered (and caused) is to enforce a conception of equality.  Each of us is in principle accountable to 
each other; none is above or below the law.‖).  In coauthored work, Goldberg and Zipursky also suggest 
some support for this idea, though they do not defend or develop the claim in any detail.  See Goldberg 
& Zipursky, Accidents, supra note 24, at 369 (arguing that tort law, as a law of ―responsibilities and re-
dress,‖ connects ―in deep ways to basic principles of liberty and democratic equality,‖ contributes to 
―the maintenance of social cohesion within a dynamic and generally individualistic culture,‖ and ―af-
firms the notion that each of us is equal in owing and being owed various obligations by others‖); Gold-
berg & Zipursky, Moral Luck, supra note 44, at 1167 (―In holding all persons—rich and poor, powerful 
and powerless—to the same duties and by empowering each to seek redress when duties are breached 
and injuries result, tort law embodies and enforces notions of social equality.‖).  See also Goldberg & 
Zipursky, Accidents, supra note 24, at 406 (positing that the idea of civil recourse allows individuals to 
be independent of both the government and of ―other private individuals' assertions of power and will 
over them,‖ thereby ―equalizing power,‖ ―disbursing power to hold individuals accountable,‖ and reduc-
ing reliance upon government). 
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core of tort law.  I argue that ―acting against‖ another in response to wrong-
doing is a distinctive form of ―moral address,‖ and one which is particularly 
salient in a society based on liberal individualism, like ours.  This form of 
moral address is instantiated in the Anglo-American tort system, where in-
dividuals make the decision to file lawsuits in response to wrongdoing and 
prosecute those lawsuits themselves, rather than relinquish that prosecutori-
al responsibility to the state.  Understanding our tort system as an instantia-
tion of this distinctive form of moral address provides the conceptual 
foundation for civil recourse theory, and perhaps other tort theories based 
on individual justice.  
Below, I break down the necessary components of the justification for 
a right to civil recourse.  In order to identify the normative basis for civil re-
course, we must ask why the accidentally harmed person is:  
(1) entitled to feel resentful towards, or angry at, the defendant;  
(2) morally justified in ―acting against‖ the defendant in some fashion;  
and  
(3) given access to a state-sponsored mechanism for doing so? 
Drawing on moral theory, section A looks at the first of these steps and 
section B the second.  This is the heart of the paper: an attempt to provide 
the conceptual foundation for a normative defense of civil recourse theory.  
In Part III, I turn from the moral and conceptual underpinnings of a right to 
recourse to the third step: political justification.  What I offer here is more 
tentative, as I begin to explore the justification for the state‘s involvement 
in providing an avenue for individuals to ―act against‖ those who have 
wronged them. 
A. Entitled to Feel Resentment 
The first step examines why the person harmed is entitled to feel re-
sentful towards the injurer.  This really consists of two subparts—first, that 
the act of the putative defendant was truly a wrong and a wrong as to the 
person harmed, and second, that resentment is an appropriate reaction.   
1. The Wrong in Accidental Harm.—The overwhelming majority of 
the tort claims in the United States are some kind of negligence claim.106  
Any interpretive theory of tort law, like the one I am offering here, must 
therefore make sense of these claims as wrongs.  
At one level, viewing accidental harms as wrongs seems fairly 
straightforward: a person has acted carelessly and caused harm to another.  
 
 
 
106
  See CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 2, 11 
(U.S. Dep‘t of Justice 1992), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cjcavilc.htm (finding 
that out of 377,421 tort cases, 277,087 were automobile accident cases and 65,372 were premises liabili-
ty cases based on ―the dangerous condition of residential or commercial property‖). 
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Indeed, judges and lawyers have little trouble discussing negligence claims 
in moral terms such as these.  But the objective, reasonable-person standard 
in negligence law has long complicated the categorization of these accidents 
as wrongs.107  If we are going to hold people to a single, objective standard 
regardless of their capabilities, such that even people who are naturally 
careless and simply incapable of meeting a standard of reasonable care will 
be held liable, then we are not making moral judgments about people that 
would warrant the use of the word ―wrong.‖108  After all, think about the 
famous Menlove in the hay-stacking case Vaughan v. Menlove109: if he were 
simply terrible at stacking hay, regardless of how much training he received 
or care he took, then he would not properly be called a wrongdoer, no mat-
ter how much harm ultimately resulted from his actions.110  And yet, under 
the objective standard, he was held liable for not performing up to the rea-
sonable person standard of care.   
Nonetheless, it is quite plausible to have standards of conduct that are 
broadly applicable to members of the community, regardless of individual 
strengths and weaknesses, and to regard the failure to achieve those stan-
dards of conduct as wrongful, even when this failure is not reflective of 
moral shortcomings.111  Indeed, we can think of the reasonable person stan-
dard as a social obligation that individuals must live up to; if they are una-
ble to live up to this standard while engaging in certain activities, they must 
forego those activities altogether in order to avoid wrongdoing.112   
In fact, although there is a lack of a consensus in tort law on the con-
tent of the ―breach‖ standard in negligence—an improper cost–benefit anal-
 
 
 
107
  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 118 (2000).  Another important source of resistance is the 
causation requirement, which arguably draws a morally arbitrary distinction between one who is held 
liable because her careless behavior happens to cause harm, and one who behaved in exactly the same 
way but was fortunate that no one was harmed by her carelessness.  This issue is discussed in Goldberg 
& Zipursky, Moral Luck, supra note 44. 
108
  See HOLMES, supra note 87, at 145–63.     
109
  (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.), 3 Bing. N.C. 468. 
110
  Others, including Goldberg and Zipursky, have written about this recently as a problem of 
―compliance luck.‖  See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, Moral Luck, supra note 44, at 1143–63. 
111
  Goldberg and Zipursky offer a more extended version of an argument like this in Part III of 
Goldberg & Zipursky, Moral Luck, supra note 44. 
112
  See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2033–41 (2007) 
(explaining the ―civil competency‖ theory of the reasonable person standard); see also Patrick J. Kelley, 
Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315 
(1990) (discussing the ―community norms‖ theory of the reasonable person standard).  Alan Calnan 
makes the point that to judge people more subjectively, on the other hand, is itself wrongful because it 
involves giving those who are unable to meet common standards of conduct more liberty than their fair 
share at the risk of violating others' security.  See Alan Calnan, The Fault(s) in Negligence Law, 25 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 695, 735 (2007); see also Arthur Ripstein, Closing the Gap, 9 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 61, 76 (2008) (―The standard of care is objective, because it permits each person to impose 
the same degree of risk on others as others impose on them.‖).  On the other hand, there are examples in 
the law, such as children and people with physical disabilities, where we do take their individual inabili-
ty to live up to common norms into account in assessing liability. 
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ysis, an unjustified disregard of risks to others, or something else—at some 
level of generality, there is agreement enough in justice- or rights-based 
theory about what the wrong is.  As Zipursky puts it: 
Rights theorists . . . seem to agree upon the following, frankly Kantian, view: 
individuals are entitled, as a matter of political morality, to a substantial level 
of respect and vigilance for their physical integrity—as well as their property.  
The standard of care of negligence law is best understood as an effort to cap-
ture this moral idea.  The standard requires that risks not be taken to some-
one‘s physical integrity that are inconsistent with that level of respect and 
vigilance.113 
Justice-based theorists have characterized this moral idea in a number 
of ways.  Some have treated the wrong as using another person as a means 
to your own end, continuing a Kantian tradition;114 others as a violation of 
social norms;115 still others as taking disproportionate risks to other persons 
or property for a relatively minor benefit to oneself.116  One criminal law 
theorist refers to the ―basic moral vice of insufficient concern for the inter-
ests of others.‖117 
Zipursky has begun to sketch an account of the wrong as not living up 
to a standard of ―civil competency‖ that one is required to attain in order to 
participate in society.118  ―I didn‘t mean any harm‖ is an acceptable excuse 
for children, but adults are expected to take care to avoid harm to others and 
are faulted when they fail to do so. 
Although the Restatement (Third) adopted a definition of a breach of 
reasonable care in terms of a ―risk-benefit‖ approach that is most consistent 
with the Hand formula at the heart of the economic account, it can easily be 
framed in more Kantian or justice-based terms, and the Restatement itself 
does not adopt a strict economic efficiency version of this ―balancing‖ ap-
proach.119   
 
 
 
113
  Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, supra note 112, at 2030. 
114
  Id.; see also Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 312–13 (1996); Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of 
Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1832–33 (2004) [hereinafter Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility].  
115
  See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1 (1999); see also Kelley, supra note 112.  
116
  See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Negligence in the Courts: Introduction and Commentary, 77 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 425, 439–40 (2002) (discussing the ―prohibitive cost‖ theory).   
117
  See Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 931, 931 (2000). 
118
  For the moment, I want to remain agnostic on these possibilities. 
119
  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1, 2005) (―Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person‘s conduct lacks rea-
sonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person‘s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable 
severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of 
harm.‖).  But see Ronen Perry, Re-Torts, 59 ALA. L. REV. 987 (2008), for a criticism of the Restate-
ment‘s definition of negligence as unwisely adopting the Hand formula.  
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We can also think of the wrong as a ―free rider‖ problem, or a unilater-
al alteration of the terms of social relations.  We have, in liberal societies, 
an agreement among ourselves: you do what you want to do, and as long as 
you don‘t bother me, I‘ll stay out of your way.  By harming me for the pur-
suit of your own ends, you have breached the terms of our social contract.  
Or maybe you‘ve just unilaterally changed them to read: ―I will do what I 
want, no matter what the consequences are to others.‖  Either way, you have 
behaved wrongfully, and wronged whomever you have harmed. 
Most simply, under any of these formulations, a person was wronged 
because the defendant exercised too much liberty in violation of the injured 
party‘s security.  This is a ―wrong‖ because the role of each individual in a 
liberal state is to use her own resources to achieve her own ends, as she so 
chooses.120  But the corresponding responsibility is that a person must not 
use someone else‘s resources in pursuit of her own ends without that per-
son‘s consent.  If a person pursues her own ends with insufficient attention 
to another‘s well-being (negligence), she violates her role in liberal socie-
ty.121   
2. An Apt Feeling.—Within this general framework, we can see it is 
plausible that the injured person is entitled to have the ―reactive attitude of 
resentment,‖ to use Peter Strawson‘s terms.122  The negligent actor has un-
ilaterally changed the terms of social relations by elevating her liberty inter-
est too far above the injured person‘s security interest.  
When one believes he has been harmed by someone‘s carelessness, re-
sentment is a ―rational‖ attitude to adopt towards that person.123  By ―ration-
 
 
 
120
  See Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility, supra note 114, at 1832–33. 
121
  Arthur Ripstein lays out a view of the wrong in terms like these in his book EQUALITY, 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW, supra note 29, and in subsequent work.  See Ripstein, Closing the Gap, 
supra note 112, at 72–80; see also Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility, supra note 114; Arthur Rips-
tein, Private Law and Private Narratives, 20(4) O.J.L.S 683 (2000); Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and 
Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391 (2006); Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, su-
pra note 37.  Goldberg has criticized Ripstein‘s notion of reasonableness in negligence law, which re-
quires a balancing of liberty and security, as being too thin a concept, and unable to explain vast swaths 
of tort law (like product liability).  See John C.P. Goldberg, Rights and Wrongs, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1828, 
1853–55 (1999) (reviewing RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW, supra note 29).  But I 
think Goldberg is too hasty in dismissing this notion.  When a pharmaceutical company, for example, 
does not put a warning on a prescription medicine, one can say that the company, its executives, and its 
shareholders are pursuing their own ends (sales and profits) with insufficient regard for the safety and 
security of others (customers).  To be sure, the concept is just that—a concept—and it does not provide 
actual answers to questions of how the liberty and security interests should be balanced in particular cir-
cumstances, but it does provide a framework for addressing the question. 
122
  P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELEAN SOCIETY 48 
(1962).  See also Goldberg & Zipursky, Moral Luck, supra note 44, at 1154 (―[V]ictims of these norm 
violations are likely to regard themselves as having been wronged and tend to have concomitant feelings 
of resentment and blame in response.‖) (citing P.F. Strawson, supra). 
123
  A related idea is that resentment is in some sense a ―natural‖ emotion, common and inevitable in 
any society where individuals hold one another to expectations.  See R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY 
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al,‖ I mean that the attitude is understandable or ―makes sense‖ because 
there is a norm that has been violated.  We accept that there is such a norm, 
the violation of which is a moral wrong such that the violator is to be 
blamed.124  If he is blameworthy, then it is rational for the harmed person to 
resent him.125  I do not mean by ―rational‖ that the feeling is clearly the ap-
propriate one to adopt (assuming such a choice is possible) after a cost–
benefit analysis.  Rather, we might say that resentment towards a wrong-
doer, after being harmed by that person‘s wrongdoing, is rational in that it is 
an ―apt feeling,‖ as Allan Gibbard puts it.126 
Resentment is a key part of our moral practices of responsibility.  By 
resenting someone who has wronged us, we adopt an attitude that holds 
them responsible for our harm.127  The philosopher Jay Wallace says that the 
reactive emotion of resentment can be best understood in terms of the ―qua-
si-evaluative stance of holding people to expectations.‖128  This seems right.  
When we resent someone, it is because we believe that the person has vi-
olated some standard, whether implicit or explicit, to which we hold them 
and are entitled to hold them.129  In the case of negligence law, the standard 
would be the demand or expectation that a person take due care to avoid 
causing harm to others.130  The resulting attitude of resentment, then, can be 
seen as a form of moral responsibility or accountability for the breach of 
that expectation.  Another natural reaction might be disappointment, but 
that attitude might not translate into holding the other accountable.131  None-
theless, it is one thing for a person to hold another accountable in private, 
but it is another to actually ―act against‖ them in some form. 
Even if there might be certain circumstances where acting against a 
wrongdoer is somehow justified, some argue that this is not acceptable in 
cases of accidental harm.132  After all, these instances of harm are, by defini-
tion, unintentional; one assumes that there was no animus displayed by the 
other person.  The oft-heard phrase ―accidents happen‖ embodies the ap-
                                                                                                                           
AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 32 (Harvard Univ. Press 1998) (discussing in part, though differing with, 
Strawsonian ideas).  
124
  See ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT 
45–50 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003). 
125
  Id. at 45. 
126
  Id. 
127
  See STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 17 (Harvard Univ. Press 2006) [hereinafter DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON 
STANDPOINT]; WALLACE, supra note 123, at 19.  
128
  WALLACE, supra note 123, at 62. 
129
  Id. at 245. 
130
  See Gideon Yaffe, Reasonableness in the Law and Second-Personal Address, 40 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 939, 960 (2007) (arguing that we can see a negligence case as an effort on the part of the plaintiff 
to ―successfully execute an act of second-personal address of a second-personal reason‖).  
131
  Thanks to Gautam Huded for this suggestion. 
132
  See, e.g., Steve Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 609–11 (1985).  
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propriate posture of fatalism we are expected to take towards accidents.133  
To want to act against the injurer would be disproportionate and unwar-
ranted, according to conventional ways of thinking about accidental harm.134  
In the next section, I take on this conventional view, illustrating the norma-
tive appeal of acting against people who have wronged you. 
B. The Normative Appeal of Acting Against One Who Has Wronged You 
In the last section, I explained that the reactive attitude of resentment is 
a natural response to the kind of wrong that is at the core of a negligence 
claim.  In this section, I seek to demonstrate that actually acting against one 
who has wronged you is often morally appropriate and desirable.  To do so, 
I employ a relatively new framework on moral philosophy—the second-
person standpoint, developed largely by Stephen Darwall135—to explicate 
this normative appeal and show how it might be fundamental to the moral 
order of a liberal society.  Then, in Part III, I explore why the state might 
underwrite such a moral order through an institution like tort law. 
I have described above why we might think of the carelessness at the 
heart of negligence as a moral wrong warranting the reactive attitude of re-
sentment, to use Strawson‘s terms.136  That still begs the question, though, 
about whether we ought to ―let go‖ of that feeling of resentment and ―move 
on,‖ or whether actually channeling that resentment into ―acting against‖ 
another is an appropriate response.137  To be clear, my task here is not to ex-
plain people‘s motives for ―acting against‖ wrongdoers, but rather to ex-
plain the normative appeal of such a practice.138  Goldberg and Zipursky 
 
 
 
133
  Indeed, Allstate‘s ―Accident Forgiveness‖ insurance plan is premised on such a notion.  The in-
surance company‘s advertisement for the plan reads: ―Accidents happen—we‘re all human.  That‘s why 
Allstate offers Accident Forgiveness.  It keeps your car insurance rates from going up just because of an 
accident—even if it‘s your fault.‖  See Allstate.com, Auto Insurance: Innovative Policy Features with 
Your Choice Auto, http://www.allstate.com/auto-insurance/auto-insurance-features.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2009).  
134
  This is why punitive damages are only allowed in cases involving intentional or reckless wrong-
doing.  See DOBBS, supra note 107, at § 381.  
135
  See generally DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 127. 
136
  See generally STRAWSON, supra note 122. 
137
  This debate still rages on among today‘s female pop vocalists (and former American Idols, no 
less).  In her song ―Since U Been Gone,‖ Kelly Clarkson sings of the liberation that comes with moving 
on from an ex, while, in contrast, Carrie Underwood praises the satisfaction that comes from getting re-
venge on a cheating ex by taking a Louisville Slugger to his car in her hit song ―Before He Cheats.‖  
KELLY CLARKSON, SINCE U BEEN GONE (RCA Records 2004); CARRIE UNDERWOOD, BEFORE HE 
CHEATS (Arista Records 2006).  See also Jessica Yadegaran, Beyond „Respect‟: Women Spell Out R-E-
VE-N-G-E in Songs, Videos, POPMATTERS, May 25, 2007, http://www.popmatters.com/pm/news/article/ 
41605/beyond-respect-women-spell-out-r-e-v-e-n-g-e-in-songs-videos (discussing the recent trend of 
―revenge fantasy‖ songs by today‘s female pop singers).  Thanks to Tyler Bryant (UGA ‗08) for situat-
ing this debate in pop culture. 
138
  The importance of the distinction will become clear later in this section when looking specifical-
ly at filing a lawsuit as the mechanism for ―acting against‖ wrongdoers.  My point is that looking at in-
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have thus far resisted this task: speaking of ―the principle of civil recourse,‖ 
they explained: ―Our point here is not that such a principle is demanded by 
principles of justice, or even morally sound, but that it is the animating idea 
behind our system of tort law.‖139  However, as I have indicated, I believe 
the principle needs more of a defense grounded in moral norms or prin-
ciples in order to gain any traction. 
There are a number of ways we could deal with the feeling of resent-
ment.  One thing we could do with resentment is simply let it simmer.  This 
was Nietzche‘s concern when he discussed the danger of ressentiment.140  
Alternatively, we could discuss what happened with friends or family: ―Can 
you believe she did that to me?‖  Or, we could simply ―let it go‖ and ―move 
on.‖ 
The final possibility is to ―act against‖ the other person or business in 
some fashion, such as by filing a lawsuit.  I define ―acting against‖ as 
speech or conduct directed towards an alleged wrongdoer to express blame 
or make a demand in response to being harmed.141  I use this particular 
phrase as the focal point for analysis because it is used by both the recourse 
theorists and Finnis in challenging them.142  
Here, I want to make the case briefly that acting against another can be 
an appropriate response, even a necessary or desirable one, and need not be 
violent or unmediated.  My aim here is not to contribute to the philosophi-
cal literature on the topic, but rather to use that literature to help illuminate 
the normative attractiveness of a social practice where people are empo-
wered to act against those who have wronged them. 
Defenders of vengeance frequently say that the appropriate response to 
wrongdoing is a ―hostile‖ one.143  But even hostile responses can come in 
many forms, ranging from pulling a gun on the wrongdoer to filing a law-
suit against her.  Perhaps an even milder version, simply asking for an apol-
ogy, might qualify as ―acting against‖ as well.  And, of course, the version 
of ―acting against‖ at issue here—the filing of a tort lawsuit—goes a step 
beyond simply private conduct or speech, by enlisting the assistance of the 
state to punish the wrongdoing. 
1. The Second-Person Standpoint on Morality.—Before we address 
filing lawsuits, we should first consider how we should think about the role 
of ―acting against‖ another in a moral community.  Moral philosophers 
                                                                                                                           
dividuals' motives for filing lawsuits is analytically distinct from examining the normative appeal of the 
social practice of acting against wrongdoers through law. 
139
  Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents, supra note 24, at 403. 
140
  See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 20–22 (Keith Ansell-Pearson 
ed., Carol Diethe trans., 2d ed. 2007). 
141
  See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962). 
142
  See FINNIS, supra note 65, at 59 (italics and changes in original) (quoting Zipursky, Rights, 
Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 44, at 85).  
143
  See, e.g., PETER FRENCH, THE VIRTUES OF VENGEANCE 187 (2001). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1792 
have generally considered questions about morality from either first-person 
perspectives—practical deliberation about ―what ought I to do?‖—or third-
person perspectives about ―what people ought to do.‖  Recently, the moral 
philosopher Stephen Darwall has outlined another viewpoint that he be-
lieves is critical to understanding moral obligation and responsibility: the 
second-person standpoint.144  This view captures something important about 
our moral practices that is not adequately accounted for by the other two 
perspectives, according to Darwall.  In this section, I suggest that Darwall‘s 
work can help illuminate the normative appeal of civil recourse theory.  
Under this system, individuals can hold one another to account for having 
wronged them.145  Indeed, I think much of what I discuss below is quite 
consistent with what the recourse theorists have said already, but gives it a 
firmer and more explicit moral grounding. 
For Darwall, the second-person standpoint is the ―perspective you and 
I take up when we make and acknowledge claims on one another‘s conduct 
and will.‖146  Darwall explains that much of our moral practices can best be 
accounted for by a set of ―second-personal reasons‖ whereby one person 
makes demands on another, and the addressee acknowledges the person‘s 
authority to make such demands.147  This perspective, Darwall argues, is 
critical in understanding well-known moral theories like the Golden Rule,148 
Kant‘s categorical imperative,149 and John Rawls‘s idea of ―rightness as 
fairness.‖150   
Darwall introduces what he calls a circle of second-personal concepts 
that work in tandem, one leading logically to the next: the second-personal 
authority of the person making a claim, making a valid claim or demand, 
grounded in a second-personal reason, and therefore implying responsibility 
of the addressee back to the person making the claim.151  Together, Darwall 
 
 
 
144
  See generally DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 127.  
145
  Darwall began to apply his ideas to legal theory, offering some brief and preliminary thoughts 
on how tort law is an instantiation of the second-person standpoint.  See Stephen Darwall, Law and the 
Second-Person Standpoint, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 891 (2007).  For an account of how Darwall‘s ideas 
might help lead to a contractualist account of contract law, see Robin Kar, Contract Law and the 
Second-Person Standpoint, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101 (2007). 
146
  See DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 127, at 3. 
147
  Id. at 4–8.  He actually claims that much of our moral practices are ―irreducible‖ to other stand-
points, id. at 11, but I need not adopt this claim for my purposes.  Nor do I need to embrace Darwall‘s 
claim that his observations about the second person standpoint lead naturally to a contractualist account 
of law as offered by T.M. Scanlon and John Rawls.  See DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, 
supra note 127, at 300–20.  For a critique of Darwall on these and other grounds, see R. Jay Wallace, 
Reasons, Relations, and Commands: Reflections on Darwall, 118 ETHICS 24 (2007). 
148
  See DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 127, at 115–17. 
149
  See id. at 32–35. 
150
  See id. at 309–10 (quoting John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 
515, 525 (1980)). 
151
  Id. at 11–12. 
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argues, these constitute a particular kind of ―practical authority‖ that is fun-
damental to our moral practices.152  
For Darwall, much of what we understand as ―moral wrongs‖ derives 
its wrongful character from the fact that one can either demand that you re-
frain from certain conduct or hold you accountable for the injurious conse-
quences of such conduct.153  In having the authority to make such claims on 
one another, we have established the norms of mutual respect and accoun-
tability in our community.  He calls this ―morality as equal accountabili-
ty.‖154   
Darwall starts with the example of a person stepping on another‘s 
foot.155  We can think of a number of reasons why the offender might decide 
that the better course of action is to remove his foot.  One reason comes 
about from a first-person inquiry—what should I do?—which can be ans-
wered with first-person reasoning—what would I want if I were in the posi-
tion of the other?  Another possibility is a third-person reason—that is, one 
considers what kind of society hers ought to be, and decides a good society 
is one in which people do not intrude onto others physically without a com-
pelling reason.156  One can think of economic justifications familiar to tort 
scholars as this kind of third-party reason: the injurer might conclude that in 
order to avoid further damage to the shoes, he should remove his foot be-
cause he is the ―cheapest cost-avoider,‖ and so his acting to prevent further 
harm would be best for society, in contrast to the person stepped on or a 
third party.157 
Another reason can be derived from what Darwall refers to as the 
―second-person standpoint.‖158  That is, that the person who is being stepped 
on says to the offender either explicitly or simply with a look: ―Why don‘t 
you step off the shoe, pal.‖  The authority of the person making the demand 
or request is derived from his status as a morally accountable equal in socie-
ty, one who wants to pursue his life plans without unwarranted intrusion 
from others.  And the offender accedes to the demand because he accepts 
the moral authority of the person stepped on to make such a demand.159 
 
 
 
152
  Id. at 11. 
153
  See id. at 99 (―There can be no such thing as moral obligation and wrongdoing without the nor-
mative standing to demand and hold agents accountable for compliance.‖).  
154
  Id. at 101. 
155
  Id. at 5–6. 
156
  Id. at 5 (―In desiring that you be free of pain, he would see this possible state of affairs as a bet-
ter way for the world to be.‖). 
157
  This idea was made famous by Guido Calabresi.  For an introduction to this theory, see GUIDO 
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
158
  See DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 127, at 3. 
159
  Darwall acknowledges that this kind of second-person reasoning can be seen as consistent with 
first-person reasons, but argues that it is quite inconsistent with third-person reasons.  See id. at 9–10.  
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Seen this way, we can understand more about the role of Strawson‘s 
―reactive attitudes‖ like indignation and resentment.160  As Strawson pointed 
out and Darwall reminds us, these attitudes are implicit demands that 
another be held accountable for not behaving according to the standards ex-
pected of him.  These reactions have a second-personal ―conceptual struc-
ture‖161—the attitude runs from me to you.  That we recognize these 
reactive attitudes as legitimate necessarily entails a commitment to the 
second-person standpoint implicit in such attitudes: the authority to stand 
before another and say: ―You have wronged me.‖162  This works in mutually 
reinforcing ways: in structuring our relations (perhaps in part through an in-
stitution like tort law), we help define the circumstances in which the reac-
tive attitude of resentment is appropriate when one has been harmed by 
carelessness.163   
Darwall‘s view of morality as equal accountability is, of course, heavi-
ly Kantian.  By acknowledging people‘s authority to make such claims or 
demands on one another, we treat them as part of a ―realm of ends.‖164  Si-
milarly, for Darwall, the Golden Rule—―Do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you‖—is a perfect example of his views.  Though one can 
conceive of this in a first-person sense, suggesting how an ethical person 
ought to behave, or a third-person sense, viewing it as a good rule for a 
well-functioning society, Darwall sees it as fundamentally second-
personal.165  Just beneath the surface of both the Golden Rule and Kantian 
categorical imperative is a second-personal justification based on reciproci-
ty: ―You can make demands of others, but you must also respond to others‘ 
demands of you.‖ 
2. Affirming Self-Respect and Moral Worth.—With Darwall‘s frame- 
work in mind, we must consider the importance of acting against wrong-
doers in a moral community.  By acting against one who has wronged us, 
we are essentially saying: ―You can‘t do that to me.‖  In doing so, we affirm 
our moral worth, self-respect, and dignity.  The philosopher Jean Hampton 
describes the idea of a ―moral injury‖166 as ―an affront to the victim‘s value 
 
 
 
160
  See Strawson, supra note 122. 
161
  DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 127, at 65–90. 
162
  See id. at 73 n.19.  Darwall uses Alanis Morrisette‘s song ―You Oughta Know‖ to make this 
point.  
163
  See id. at 141. 
164
  This is a modified version of Kant‘s ―kingdom of ends.‖  See id. at 306. 
165
  Id. at 115–17 (placing the Golden Rule squarely within the ―second-personal circle of concepts‖ 
discussed in the book). 
166
  See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1992) [hereinafter Hampton, Correcting Harms].  To be sure, Hampton did not 
appear to believe that this kind of ―moral injury‖ had occurred in all tort cases.  See id. at 1664–65 (cit-
ing as examples where ―moral injury‖ is not at issue both Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation. Compa-
ny, 124 N.W. 221 (1910), and a hypothetical case where a slightly careless driver slips on the road on a 
rainy day after rounding a turn and hits another car).  Anthony Sebok relies heavily on Hampton‘s no-
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or dignity.‖167  Acting against the wrongdoer is a means by which the victim 
can negate this affront.  Where the wrong has ―diminished‖168 the value of 
the victim, the retributive response that Hampton discusses ―is intended to 
vindicate the value of the victim‖ and restore her to the status of an equal.169 
On the other hand, being too hasty to forgive, or too reluctant to con-
front, might allow the moral diminishment to remain intact.  We instinctive-
ly favor the idea of forgiveness as an appropriate and morally superior way 
of responding to one who has wronged us.  But an important strain in philo-
sophical thought questions the moral superiority of forgiveness.170  The phi-
losopher Jeffrie Murphy, for example, suggests three reasons—self-respect, 
self-defense, and respect for the moral order—why we ought not be so 
quick to forgive, and why some measure of resentment is good.171  We 
might also (and some do) frame these first two reasons as being about main-
taining personal honor or individual dignity. 
Vindication by the state, when it acts against the wrongdoer on our be-
half, can underscore our moral worth as well.172  But perhaps we enjoy the 
best of both worlds when, instead of acting alone, we act against the 
wrongdoer through a state apparatus (like tort law): being the one to call a 
wrongdoer to account might affirm our self-respect,173 while the state back-
ing our impulse by giving us a forum to do so affirms our moral worth in 
the community. 
Criminal law theorists often refer to the function of criminal law as be-
ing, in part, aimed at ―restoring the moral order.‖174  If we let criminal 
wrongs go unpunished, the norms against such actions will weaken, and 
members of the community will be less secure.  Indeed, if the role of acting 
against a wrongdoer operates in part to reinforce the moral order, then one 
could argue (and many have) that not acting against the wrongdoer, even 
out of a desire to forgive, should be frowned upon.  As William Ian Miller 
put it in discussing honor cultures: ―Honor did not allow for refusing to re-
                                                                                                                           
tion of ―moral injury‖ to support his interpretive account of punitive damages, consistent with civil re-
course theory.  See Anthony Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 
1015–20 (2007). 
167
  See Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 166, at 1666. 
168
  See id. at 1673–75. 
169
  Id. at 1686.  Though unlike tort law, the retributive justice that Hampton discusses is delivered 
through the state and criminal laws. 
170
  See generally JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN (2003) (offering a qualified defense of ven-
geance, and suggesting that forgiveness is appropriate only in limited circumstances); ROBERT 
SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE 272–86 (1995) (explaining that ―vengeance is the original passion 
for justice‖).  
171
  See MURPHY, supra note 170, at 18–20. 
172
  See Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1086–91 (2007). 
173
  Though this is an empirical question, it seems intuitively plausible that taking the action oneself 
might serve self-respect values in ways that the state or another doing so might not.  
174
  See, e.g., Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of 
Bias Crime Statutes, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1015, 1025 (1997) (citing George Fletcher and Michael Moore). 
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deem lost honor.‖175  Perhaps if too many failed to act against those who 
wronged them, the moral order would be harmed.   
3. Moral Responsibility Ascription.—In acting against a wrongdoer, 
victims play a role in ascribing moral responsibility.  As a practical matter, 
in many circumstances, only the harmed person can say: ―I know what you 
did.‖  Without the victim acting against the wrongdoer, the wrongdoer 
might not be held responsible at all. 
Indeed, some philosophers have argued that we cannot have a coherent 
secular conception of moral responsibility without the practice of victims 
holding wrongdoers to account.176  That is to say, the very idea of being mo-
rally responsible to one another (as opposed to God) is fundamentally 
linked to the victim‘s reactive emotion of resentment and the practice of the 
victim holding the wrongdoer responsible for his actions.  By engaging in 
this practice, we create moral communities, not only by ascribing moral re-
sponsibility once harm has been caused, but in defining the moral obliga-
tions themselves.177  Indeed the very definition of a moral obligation might 
be a prohibition or requirement which, if violated, makes one susceptible to 
being held to account. 
4. Accountability of Equals.—To act against another who has carele- 
ssly harmed you is to object to someone who has violated the terms of so-
cial interaction by taking more than his share of liberty in violation of your 
security.178  By responding to this action, the injurer reinforces the obliga-
tion that he has to moderate the pursuit of his own ends in recognition of 
others‘ rights to pursue theirs.  If the injurer does not respond, it could be a 
sign that he does not value the terms of social interaction, or at least cares 
not to uphold them in his relations with the victim.  That is why people of-
ten encourage us to act against or confront one who has wronged us.   
By acting against the wrongdoer, one demands respect.  This is what 
Darwall refers to as ―recognition respect‖—respect not for one‘s good cha-
racter or a job well done, but simply respect for another as an equal in a 
moral community.179  Indeed, in interviews after Carol Ernst‘s trial, jurors 
voiced anger at the lack of ―respect‖ Merck showed for its customers by not 
disclosing all of Vioxx‘s risks.  Richard Epstein, who wrote a scornful op-
ed in the Wall Street Journal after the Ernst verdict called ―Ambush in An-
gleton,‖ suggested that this lack of respect referenced by the jurors could 
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  WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 57 (2006).   
176
  See, e.g., FRENCH, supra note 143, at 109; Darwall, supra note 145, at 95. 
177
  See DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 127, at 99. 
178
  Murphy describes this as ―resentment that another has taken unfair advantage of one‘s sacrifices 
by free riding in a mutually beneficial scheme of reciprocal cooperation.‖  Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgive-
ness and Resentment, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 14, 16 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1988). 
179
  See DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 127, at 123, 126.  
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not possibly have anything to do with tort law.180  But he might well be 
wrong. 
In the context of ―recognition respect,‖ then, it starts to become more 
plausible that the waitress is forced to pay damages to Donald Trump when 
she rear-ends his car.181  We should not assign moral weight to the justness 
of restoring the previous distribution of resources, as corrective justice 
theorists would, but we should assign normative force to recognizing the 
two as mutually accountable.  The waitress has to answer to Trump for the 
lack of recognition respect exhibited by her careless driving, just as Trump 
would have to answer to the waitress for the same wrong. 
Carol Ernst had been a nurse all her life, and her husband worked at 
Wal-Mart, making $21,700 a year.  Yes, she could have written a letter to 
Merck complaining, and she may or may not have gotten a nice form letter 
back—not much accountability there.  She might have gone to the local 
prosecutors or the state attorney general to see if they might be interested in 
criminally prosecuting or bringing some kind of civil action against the 
company for fraud, and she may not have gotten in the door, been success-
ful in encouraging an action, or been permitted a voice in that action should 
it have occurred.  But in bringing a lawsuit, she had a forum for saying di-
rectly to the officers and directors of Merck: ―I know what you did, and you 
can‘t do this to me.‖  We ought to think well of her for standing up for her-
self and her husband and demanding that the company be held accountable. 
In the next Part, I take up the question of why the state ought to un-
derwrite a system for acting against wrongdoers, but it is worth pausing to 
underscore the import of Darwall‘s work for the civil recourse theory of tort 
law.  Contra the views of advocates of no-fault insurance schemes, econom-
ic theorists, and even some corrective justice theorists, the particular struc-
ture of tort law—where injured parties have the option of initiating 
lawsuits, prosecuting the lawsuits themselves, and addressing their claim 
for relief to those who wronged them—may well have value in our moral 
practices, and play a role in constituting a liberal society of equally accoun-
table persons.  Indeed, it may be that the structure and practice of tort law is 
critical to the very point of tort law itself.182 
 
 
 
180
  Epstein, supra note 6.   
181
  This sort of example, pointing out the tension between corrective and distributive justice, is dis-
cussed by other scholars, including in Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort Theory, supra note 25, at 574–
75. 
182
  Thanks to Scott Hershovitz for suggesting a version of this point.  See also John Gardner, The 
Mark of Responsibility, 23 O.J.L.S 157, 167 (2003) (―The fundamental point is to have structured expla-
natory dialogues in public, in which the object of explanation is ourselves.  This point is not a point rela-
tive to which the procedure is instrumental; rather the point is in the procedure.‖). 
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III. JUSTIFYING A STATE-SPONSORED FORUM FOR ACTING AGAINST 
WRONGDOERS  
In the previous two Parts, I demonstrated that individuals are morally 
justified in feeling resentment towards, and wanting to act against, those 
who have carelessly caused harm to their person or property.  Previous 
scholars have argued against tort law as a system of recourse for wrongs in 
part on the ground that doing so would validate vengeful feelings.183  In ar-
guing that resentful feelings and the ―act against‖ instinct are indeed moral-
ly justified, I hoped to make the conceptual space for an argument that a 
legal system that provides a state-created mechanism for individuals to ob-
tain redress of wrongs is itself normatively attractive and politically justi-
fied.   
That is the argument I begin to undertake here.  I do so in four steps: 
first, I point out that such a mechanism appears to be a ―cultural universal,‖ 
existing across history and cultures.  Here I simply aim to persuade skeptics 
that the existence of such a mechanism in Anglo-American law ought not to 
be considered such a puzzle.  Then, I consider and question a justification 
that the recourse theorists have put forward recently—namely, that tort law 
helps form and reinforce ―loci of responsibility‖ in society.  Next, I step 
back and isolate the precise role of the state in tort law, and why it serves 
this function.  Finally, I begin to translate Darwall‘s moral norm of equal 
accountability into a political justification for tort law that fits well with re-
course theory. 
My aim here is modest: I do not seek to demonstrate that such a system 
is an ineliminable part of a liberal state such that, for example, a New Zeal-
and-style no-fault scheme would be illegitimate or otherwise unacceptable.  
Nor do I seek to demonstrate that the benefits of such a system outweigh its 
costs.  Rather, I seek simply to persuade the reader that the state has good 
reason to support such a system, whether or not it is obligated to do so as a 
matter of political morality. 
A. Understanding the Precise Role of the State 
1. Why Should the State Get Involved at All?—Questions remain ab- 
out the role of the state in bringing about private justice.  That is, why does 
the state set up an institution—tort law—where individuals can make for-
mal, mediated, and in some ways highly stylized claims that another has 
wronged them?  
 
 
 
183
  See, e.g., Finnis, supra note 75, at 56; see also CALABRESI, supra note 157, at 298 (arguing that 
the belief shared by individual justice theorists that there must be a connection between the injurers and 
the injured might stem from the idea that one should give the victim the ―right to see to it that the injurer 
is brought to justice,‖ and observing that this ―smacks . . . of revenge‖ and ―stems . . . from the not very 
healthy urge to get even‖). 
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First, though, we must recognize the long lineage, across cultures and 
throughout history, of some mechanism for responding to wrongs by acting 
against a wrongdoer.  Anthropological studies, for example, have identified 
certain ―cultural universals‖ that exist across very different kinds of socie-
ties throughout the world; among these universals are the right to redress 
wrongs and the provision of mechanisms for retaliation.184  Indeed, chim-
panzees also appear to have a system for acting against those who have 
wronged them.185   
To be sure, these mechanisms have come in many different forms.  In 
some parts of the world today, and in medieval English society under the 
wergeld system, clans, rather than individuals, would act against one anoth-
er.186  If a member of a clan wrongfully harmed another in some way, then 
the victim‘s clan would either act against the injurer‘s clan in some way or 
accept compensation in order to settle the score.  In societies with a strong 
centralized state, the state might take on the function of acting against 
wrongdoers for a variety of types of wrongs, similar to the way we prose-
cute crimes.  These examples thus contradict those who think that a system 
of empowering individuals to act against those who have wronged them in a 
mediated way should not be part of a civilized society. 
Nonetheless, the state could support private justice passively rather 
than actively, by tolerating a victim‘s privately acting against a wrongdoer.  
That is, the state could stand quietly by while a victim goes to the injurer‘s 
house and yells at him, breaks his window, or punches him in the nose.  If 
the injurer tried to press criminal charges or other kinds of claims against 
the victim,187 the state could recognize a defense of justification by the vic-
tim, subject to some kind of proportionality review as all such defenses 
are.188  This system would thus allow the state to support the individual‘s 
desire for a response from her injurer, and allow her to vindicate her own 
interests, thereby reaffirming her dignity and autonomy. 
The state might be concerned, though, that the angry response might be 
less than impartial and disproportionate in too many cases relative to the 
 
 
 
184
  See Paul Robinson, Owen Jones & Robert Kurzban, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1683 n.215, 1683–84 (2007) (using the evidence of human universals across 
cultures as evidence of an evolutionary biology explanation for shared, core intuitions of justice, as op-
posed to social learning and other alternatives). 
185
  See id. at 1658. 
186
  See, e.g., Jared Diamond, Vengeance Is Ours, NEW YORKER, Apr. 21, 2008, at 74–87 (discuss-
ing the role of vengeance in clan warfare in the New Guinea Highlands). 
187
  One example of the state adopting this posture is self-defense in tort or criminal law.  See, e.g., 
6 AM. JUR. 2D Assault and Battery § 120 (2008) (discussing the availability of self-defense against torts 
of assault of battery); ROBERT E. CLEARY, JR., KURTZ CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND DEFENSES IN GEORGIA 
1444 (Thomson West 2007) (discussing the availability of self-defense in criminal law).   
188
  On proportionality in tort law, see, for example, 6 AM. JUR. 2D Twentieth Century Tort Theory 
§ 124 (―One cannot use force in excess of that necessary under the circumstances.‖).  On proportionality 
in criminal law, see, for example, CLEARY, JR., supra note 187, at 1461 (―A defendant may use only that 
amount of force necessary to defend himself.‖). 
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original harm.189  Moreover, allowing such a response could lead to escalat-
ing cycles of violence akin to the blood feuds that in part drove the state to 
create a monopoly on retribution through the criminal law.190  This is the 
standard account explaining state involvement in private justice, but there 
might be another explanation.  The philosopher Peter French has suggested 
that the danger of this system is not that the response to the wrongdoing 
will often be too great, but rather that it will not be enough—that is, norms 
would be violated at will, and people would be too fearful to respond.191  
Without a proper response, the norms themselves might be undermined.  
Doing nothing might thus be a poor option for the state, because it would 
signal that the violation of norms is unimportant.192 
2. Why Should the State Not Do the Task Itself?—If the state wishes 
to ensure an impartial, proportionate response to accidental harms, why 
does the state not assume the entire responsibility itself the way it does for 
crimes?  That is, the state could respond to cases of accidental harm by col-
lecting a fine or other penalty, an apology perhaps, from the injurer.  But 
the state, rather than the victim, would decide which actions to bring and 
would bring these actions.  After all, if tort law is about restoring the moral 
order in some sense, then perhaps the state should enforce this moral order 
itself. 
Alternatively, if the state is primarily concerned with accountability, 
we might also ask why the state does not require individuals to bring such 
lawsuits when they have been wronged?  For example, research indicates 
that there is significant underclaiming of medical malpractice; many people 
who are harmed by medical malpractice never bring a lawsuit.193  Does this 
not mean that the moral order, or the balance between doctors and patients, 
is out of alignment?  
But the nature of resentment cuts against requiring that victims act 
against wrongdoers.  That is, resentment is rational when the other person is 
blameworthy, in the sense that they are proper recipients of our moral op-
 
 
 
189
  See Paul H. Robinson, Legality and Discretion in the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 
25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 425–26 (1988) (noting that special legislative provisions which make avail-
able the defense of self-defense ―can easily result in improper outcomes,‖ often because the means of 
self-defense is unnecessary or disproportionate to the threat).     
190
  For some accounts of the origins of the criminal law, see BRADLEY CHAPIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
IN COLONIAL AMERICA, 1606–1660 (1983) (discussing the development of criminal law in the early 
United States); Daniel Klerman, Settlement and the Decline of Private Prosecution in Thirteenth-
Century England, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2001) (describing the decline of private criminal prosecution 
in medieval England). 
191
  See FRENCH, supra note 143, at 110–11. 
192
  See Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 166, at 1694 (noting that, especially for serious 
crimes, the state may be the only institution that can respond and send an appropriate message on behalf 
of the community as an agent of retribution).   
193
  See David Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice 
Litigation, 354 N. ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2025 (2006).  
103:1765  (2009) Equal Accountability Through Tort Law 
 1801 
probrium.194  But the attribution of blame is not required.195  If we choose to 
let go of the moral emotion that induces us to take action holding another 
accountable, that is acceptable.196  
The state instead creates a system that empowers victims to bring 
claims, if they so choose, against the parties who wronged them.  The pro-
cedural mechanisms, though not unique to tort law, nicely accommodate 
calling wrongdoers to account.  The action begins with filing a ―complaint,‖ 
and delivering the complaint to the alleged wrongdoer.  The wrongdoer 
then provides an ―answer,‖ explaining why her actions were not wrongful.  
The victim herself must demonstrate that a wrong has occurred, and that the 
injurer ought to be liable for it.197  Below I consider why we might have a 
normative preference for such a system. 
3. Recourse Theory‟s Possible Answer: Loci of Responsibility.—The 
question remains: why exactly should we have such a system?  In recent 
work, Goldberg and Zipursky have discussed the idea that tort law contri-
butes to or helps reinforce ―loci of responsibility‖ among individuals, which 
consist of ―spheres of interaction that come with, and are defined (in part) 
by relational duties: obligations that are owed by one person to others when 
interacting with those others in certain contexts and in certain ways.‖198  
Negligence law specifically focuses on loci of responsibility that ―feature 
obligations to act with care for certain interests of others.‖199  The idea is 
that when judges and juries decide in response to lawsuits that a duty is or is 
 
 
 
194
  See GIBBARD, supra note 124, at 47 (―[A]n observer thinks an act blameworthy . . . if and only if 
he thinks it rational for the agent to feel guilty over the act . . . .‖); WALLACE, supra note 123, at 245 
(―[R]esentment requires the belief that someone else has violated a demand to which I hold them.‖); 
Strawson, supra note 122, at 3 (noting the ―familiar‖ sentiment that ―the man who is the subject of justi-
fied punishment, blame or moral condemnation must really deserve it‖). 
195
  Jonathan Bennett, Accountability, in PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO P.F. 
STRAWSON 21 (Zach van Straaten ed., 1980) (noting that some ―theories offer us a way of handling ac-
countability . . . in a manner which does not demand reactive feelings‖ such as blame).   
196
  See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 178.  
Murphy discusses forgiveness as an acceptable means of letting go of resentment, but only if it is ―con-
sistent with self-respect‖ and does ―not involve complicity or acquiescence in wrongdoing.‖  Id. at 19.  I 
would add that if there is too little ―acting against‖ wrongdoers, this might be a threat to the moral order.  
197
  See Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 607 (―Tort law involves a lit-
eral empowerment of victims—it confers on them standing to demand a response to their mistreat-
ment.‖); Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 734 (―When the state has recognized a right of 
action, and when a plaintiff has proven it, the state . . . empowers a plaintiff to act against a defendant.‖). 
198
  Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents, supra note 24, at 368.  See also Goldberg, Constitutional Sta-
tus of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 608 (describing ―loci of responsibility‖ as ―particular contexts go-
verned by norms of appropriate conduct that actors must observe for the benefit of identifiable classes of 
potential victims‖). 
199
  Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents, supra note 24, at 368. 
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not owed to another, or that the standard of care was or was not breached, 
they are helping to constitute these ―loci of responsibility.‖200 
To be sure, they do not offer this as the principal justification for hav-
ing a state-sponsored system of civil recourse.201  But this does appear to be 
the justification that they have put forward and developed in the most detail, 
and so it is worth examining here.  Though I agree that they have identified 
an important aspect of the value of tort law, I do not think this can get us 
the kind of normative justification that civil recourse theory needs (and that 
theorists like Finnis have sought).  I will demonstrate why by way of exam-
ple.   
The mother of a fourteen-year-old girl who had allegedly been sexually 
assaulted by a nineteen-year-old who she met online brought a well-
publicized lawsuit against the social networking site MySpace a few years 
ago.202  The mother‘s argument was that MySpace was negligent in failing 
to implement greater security measures, which would have revealed that the 
man was not a high school senior, as he claimed online.203  One of MyS-
pace‘s defenses and its grounds for a motion to dismiss was that they had 
no duty to protect the girl, and this became the critical issue of the case.204  
Negligence law is centrally concerned with defining obligations in different 
domains of social interaction, and this is precisely the kind of case where 
recourse theory ought to be of some use in thinking through the result.   
How should the judge decide this case?  Recourse theorists would like-
ly suggest that the judge should reason by analogy to existing precedent, as 
the judge appeared to do in this case.205  The plaintiff here analogized this 
case to one involving landlords or parking lot owners who are sued for the 
failure to protect against foreseeable criminal conduct on their property by a 
 
 
 
200
  See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Obligations and the Internal Aspect of Rules, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1229, 1250 (2006) (describing his and Goldberg‘s work as being about ―the idea that tort law as-
signs liability in response to its judgment that a legal obligation to the plaintiff has been violated‖).  
201
  In fact, they are careful to limit their claim, saying that the ―constructing and sustaining obliga-
tions and responsibilities owed among persons and other entities‖ is not precisely described as a ―goal‖ 
of or even ―constraint‖ on tort law.  Goldberg & Zipursky, Accidents, supra note 24, at 405–06.  Rather, 
they seem to be arguing that this aspect of tort law is among important ―evaluative dimensions along 
which to measure the value of the fault system.‖  Id.  They put it this way: ―In answer to the broader, 
and still important question about the fault system, ‗What good is it?‘, ‗It plays a major role in sustaining 
forms of responsibility and obligation,‘ is a responsive reply.‖  Id. at 406.  Elsewhere in the piece, they 
refer to tort law as ―an effort to recognize, refine, reinforce, and revise obligations that are instinct in 
various standard social interactions.‖  Id. at 391.   
202
  See Girl, 14, Sues MySpace over Alleged Sex Assault, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 20, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.MSNBC.msn.com/id/13437619/. 
203
  Id. 
204
  See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 851–52 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff‟d, 528 F.3d 413 
(5th Cir. 2008). 
205
  See Goldberg & Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 
supra note 44, at 740 (explaining that courts deciding duty questions ought to interpret precedent in light 
of various factors). 
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third party.  MySpace responded that their status as a service provider was 
not analogous to that of these landowners sometimes held responsible under 
―premises liability‖ principles in tort law.206  The District Court agreed with 
MySpace, and held that they did not have a duty to protect the girl.207 
According to recourse theory, the judge has done his job by helping to 
define and refine obligations.  In doing so, he has demonstrated the value of 
tort law in defining relational wrongs and providing recourse to victims of 
said wrongs.  However, though this may well be part of the value of tort 
law, I am skeptical that it can go very far in justifying the system‘s exis-
tence.208  The reasons are threefold and related: first, the court‘s role here 
faces institutional competence problems; second, the jury—not the judge—
is the principal adjudicator of what is or isn‘t a relational wrong; and third, 
the conceptual fit is shaky between this function of tort law and the ―prin-
ciple of civil recourse‖ that is the core of recourse theory. 
First, a judge adjudicating a case is not ideally situated to decide 
whether a social networking site ought to have a legal obligation to protect 
its users from foreseeable criminal harm.  This is the classic institutional 
competence or ―legal process‖ argument against various forms of judicial 
lawmaking in tort and other areas of law.209  In order to make a decision 
about whether there ought to be such an obligation, one would want more 
information on the cost of implementing greater security measures, the de-
gree to which such security measures are likely to prevent harm, and other 
policy considerations.  A legislature or administrative agency is in a much 
better position to gather and evaluate such information than is a judge adju-
dicating a case between two private parties.   
The recourse theorists might well respond that although weighing rele-
vant policy considerations is one way to determine such obligations, it is 
not the only way, and may not be the best way.  Judges have for years 
helped define such obligations quite capably, the argument goes, by resort-
ing to traditional methods of common-law adjudication: drawing analogies 
to existing precedent, looking to the obligations of similarly situated actors, 
and taking guidance from social norms.   
But this view is complicated by the fact that in most instances, it is not 
even the judge who determines these obligations in deciding ―duty‖ ques-
tions—it is the jury deciding the more-frequently litigated issue of breach.  
The MySpace example is somewhat unusual in that the duty issue was ac-
 
 
 
206
  See Doe, 474 F.Supp.2d at 851–52. 
207
  Id. 
208
  To be sure, this thought experiment contains an implicit view of what counts as an adequate 
normative justification that would almost certainly be contested by Goldberg and Zipursky with their 
―pragmatic conceptualism‖ approach.  See supra note 79.  
209
  See HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 158–67 (1994) (introducing a ―pre-
liminary comparison of the functions and functioning of the most important of the institutions‖ in the 
American legal system) 
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tually contested; in most cases, the existence of a duty is simply assumed, 
and then the question of whether the duty has been breached (the wrong) 
goes to the jury.210  These decisions, which are given by the jury in the form 
of a checkmark on a verdict sheet (i.e., ―Yes, negligent‖ or ―No, not negli-
gent‖), without reasons or precedential value, are the primary place in the 
tort system where what counts as a ―relational wrong‖ is determined.211  
One can also approach this question from an institutional design pers-
pective: if the question is, ―what is the best way for the state to contribute to 
the construction and maintenance of appropriate obligations among persons 
and entities?‖212 then it seems unlikely that—at least in relatively new 
spheres of interaction as in the My Space lawsuit—the answer would be 
―by some combination of common-law judges reasoning by analogy to ex-
isiting precedent and juries referencing social norms,‖ as opposed to ―by a 
legislature or agency based on the relevant policy considerations.‖213  If this 
is correct, then defining loci of responsibility seems relatively weak as a 
justification for having a tort law system in the first place.214   
Finally, there is a weak conceptual link between the ―animating idea‖ 
of civil recourse and its construction and sustenance of the obligations 
among individuals.  While recourse theory emphasizes the ―power-
conferring‖ aspect of tort law—the plaintiff‘s entitlement to recourse—the 
loci of responsibility justification emphasizes the ―duty-imposing‖ aspect of 
tort law: the obligations of putative defendants.215  To be sure, recourse 
theory sees these two aspects of tort law as closely related, but the theory‘s 
distinctiveness has centered on what the law of torts does for the plaintiff—
empowering her to make demands for redress—not to the defendant.  If de-
fining and maintaining social obligations is indeed a main justification for 
tort law, then it is hard to see why an individual‘s right to recourse against 
one who has wronged him would be its animating idea.216 
 
 
 
210
  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7(b) (Proposed Final 
Draft No. 1, 2005) (―In exceptional cases . . . a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that 
the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.‖) (emphasis added).  
211
  The jury‘s role in deciding these kinds of evaluative issues in tort may be problematic for the 
idea of tort as a law of private wrongs.  I intend to explore this issue further in future work.  
212
  Again, Goldberg and Zipursky might well object to this framing of the question, but I think it is 
useful in helping to sharpen the ultimate issue of whether the tort law system can be justified. 
213
  Although many areas of tort law are now governed in part by statute, the determinations of who 
owes obligations to whom, and what the content of those obligations are, remains decided by judges and 
juries.  
214
  Again, Goldberg and Zipursky‘s claim is more limited, see supra note 201, but this section is de-
signed to ―test‖ the possibility that the loci-of-responsibility aspect of tort law might provide a broader 
normative justification for tort law.  
215
  H.L.A. HART, supra note 64, at 26–33 (introducing the distinction between these two kinds of 
rules).  
216
  To be sure, one could say these are merely two sides of the same coin: defining who owes re-
sponsibilities, or who is owed responsibilities.  But recourse theory has emphasized the plaintiff‘s role in 
initiating and prosecuting tort actions, and has used this to help distinguish the theory both from correc-
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The recourse theorists do hint at another possible justification for tort 
law that has more potential.  In a recent piece, Goldberg powerfully devel-
ops the idea that a ―right of redress‖ is embedded in the political and consti-
tutional structure of the United States.217  In examining the origins and 
nature of this right to redress, Goldberg suggests that a political justification 
for having a right to redress embedded in the legal system—indeed, having 
a law of ―civil recourse‖—is that it decentralizes power and enhances 
equality.218 
This notion of political or social equality, of course, is quite consonant 
with Darwall‘s moral notion of equal accountability, described above.  As 
such, it appears to have greater promise as a normative justification for the 
institution of tort law.  
B. A State-Sponsored System of Equal Accountability 
One could take Jules Coleman‘s view, discussed above,219 that our par-
ticular system is essentially a contingent one, set up in the way that it is for 
practical reasons.220  But I want to resist that path.  Rather, I think there is 
normative force behind the particular legal mechanism for redress because 
it helps vindicate and instantiate the second-person moral order that Darwall 
has described.221  This mechanism, which enables individuals in a liberal 
society to hold one another accountable, is the essence of what we mean by 
―tort law.‖  That is, it not only helps provide the answer to ―What is tort law 
for?‖222 but also ―What is tort law?‖ 
To understand this, consider for a moment, more precisely and tho-
roughly than we have done thus far, how our tort system is structured.  It 
not only allows the victim to privately initiate the suit, but also to privately 
prosecute the suit.  This may seem intuitively obvious, but it is by no means 
inevitable.  Indeed, we could have a system similar to that found in New 
Zealand, where a person who is injured simply makes a claim to the state 
                                                                                                                           
tive justice theories and from criminal law where the state decides what actions to bring and prosecutes 
them. 
217
  See Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 531–68. 
218
  Id. at 607–08. 
219
  See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
220
  For a similar state-outsourcing argument on punitive damages, see Dan Markel, Retributive 
Damages, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009). 
221
  Though without specific reference to Darwall, the recourse theorists do offer ideas in this vein in 
recent work, and I am attempting to build on and extend that work here.  See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, 
Moral Luck, supra note 44, at 1168 (noting that when courts are asked to enforce victims‘ demand for 
compensation, they are in part considering ―who might fairly complain of having been wronged by the 
carelessness of another‖); Goldberg & Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, supra note 44, at 1646 (―The power 
to enforce in torts derives from having been the victim of a wrong.‖); Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Re-
sponsibility, supra note 98, at 124–28 (developing an ―agency-linking conception of blameworthiness‖ 
that can be used in part to understand tort law as identifying who is ―appropriately vulnerable‖ to 
blame). 
222
  See Gardner, supra note 182, at 167. 
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and receives compensation from a public fund for her injury.223  We could 
also have a system where the victim does not receive compensation, but ra-
ther asks the state to track down the injurer and elicit an apology.  Instead, 
under our tort system, the victim hires a lawyer to make the claim against 
the defendant directly; indeed, superficially mundane service of process can 
be seen as vindicating second-person moral principles. 
There is an additional feature of tort law that is by no means inevitable: 
under our system, the injurer has to respond to the victim‘s accusation that 
he has wronged her, and if the wrong is proven to the satisfaction of a judge 
or jury, the injurer has to provide a remedy, usually money damages, to the 
victim herself, rather than to the state or anyone else.  This feature, too, vin-
dicates the notion that we owe duties to one another to moderate the pursuit 
of our own ends in order to protect the interests of others, and when we 
breach those duties, we must ourselves answer to those we harm and settle 
accounts.   
These observations are a core part of the bilateral critique that correc-
tive justice theory makes of economics, developed primarily by Ernest 
Weinrib and Jules Coleman and furthered by the recourse theorists.  But 
even the corrective justice theorists do not have reasons for explaining why 
the system is set up this way, aside from Weinrib‘s assertion that the doer 
and sufferer are locked in a ―reciprocal normative embrace.‖224  Below I of-
fer some reasons to believe that the system itself has normative force. 
1. Upholding the Authority of the Victim.—By giving people who are 
injured the opportunity to hold others accountable, the state upholds the au-
thority of individuals to both demand that others moderate their conduct ex 
ante, and receive an explanation and a settling of accounts ex post.  By forc-
ing individuals to respond to a claim of wrong by another,225 we maintain 
their autonomy and treat them as part of a continued web of mutual obliga-
tion in our moral and political community, deserving of respect.226   
Indeed, one implicit premise of both the tort reform and preemption ef-
forts is the questioning of the authority of the victim.227  The tort reformers 
 
 
 
223
  For an overview of New Zealand‘s no-fault accident compensation scheme, see generally Peter 
Davis et al., Compensation for Medical Injury in New Zealand: Does “No-Fault” Increase the Level of 
Claims Making and Reduce Social and Clinical Selectivity?, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 833, 835–
37 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 187 (2008); Rosemary 
Tobin & Elsabe Schoeman, The New Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme: The Statutory Bar and 
the Conflict of Laws, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 493 (2006). 
224
  WEINRIB, supra note 29, at 142. 
225
  See id. at 107 n.65 (noting the law‘s coercive authority ―in subjecting wrongful action to an 
equal reaction that undoes the wrong‖).  
226
  See id. at 103 (discussing this ―network of reciprocal pressures‖). 
227
  Although this is often framed as questioning the authority of juries, it implicitly questions the 
authority of the plaintiff who puts the question to the jury.  See Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, 
Alternative Designs, and the Restatement (Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 
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ask the victim–plaintiff: ―Who are you to second guess the expertise of the 
doctor who treated you?‖  The preemption proponents ask: ―Who are you to 
second guess the FDA‘s decision that a drug is safe enough for the mar-
ket?‖228  What authority do you have?  Where do you get the right to bring 
this claim? 
Most directly, of course, the right comes from tort law.  But my argu-
ment here is that tort law itself comes from a moral order based on equal 
accountability.  It is this moral accountability that ultimately gives the 
plaintiff the authority to demand that the doctor and the drug company an-
swer for their decisions and conduct.229 
2. A Moral Community of Equals Who Are Mutually Accountable.—
My argument is that these structural features—vesting the decision whether 
to prosecute with the plaintiff alone, leaving the plaintiff in charge of the 
lawsuit, and directing the lawsuit against the particular wrongdoer—help il-
luminate the precise role that tort law plays in our normative order.230  Our 
particular mechanism for accountability upholds our particular Darwallian 
normative order.  Our obligations are not to our clan or to the state.  Both 
the ―sources of normativity,‖231 and the objects of normativity, as it were, 
are our fellow citizens.  
Tort law, and the accountability it enforces, affirms that our activities 
and our life plans are ours,232 and that we must answer for the harm that 
comes from them if we take insufficient care.  I am not claiming here that 
tort law reinforces our normative order by establishing or reaffirming social 
norms, such as to be careful when driving or not to defame others, though 
                                                                                                                           
220–21 (1999) (―[W]ith such careful regulatory oversight, we need not have tort law (and inexpert ju-
ries) second-guessing FDA expert determinations.‖).  
228
  The Wall Street Journal editorial page recently made this same point in reference to plaintiffs‘ 
lawyers in an editorial criticizing Congress‘s attempts to overrule the recent Riegel preemption decision.  
See Editorial, Devices for Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2008, at A16 (―If Democrats want tort law-
yers and juries of laymen to be the ultimate arbiters of new devices, then they should do away with the 
FDA entirely . . . .‖). 
229
  It is possible, of course, that the precise legal mechanism by which the plaintiff calls he who has 
harmed her to account might undermine the plaintiff‘s authority and, relatedly, the legitimacy of the sys-
tem of accountability.  Indeed, I am concerned about this problem in the context of the jury‘s authority 
to decide the question of ―breach,‖ and the relatively flexible and ill-defined reasonableness standard at 
the heart of most tort claims, including product liability claims.  I intend to explore this concern, and 
possible reforms to address it, in a separate paper. 
230
  See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 733 (―A central . . . phenomenon of tort law is 
that a plaintiff sues a defendant.‖). 
231
  See generally CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY (1996) (critiquing 
leading moral theories). 
232
  See Ripstein, As If It Had Never Happened, supra note 39, at 1985 (noting that ―your entitlement 
to your person and property does not depend on the particular purposes you pursue with it‖). 
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tort law may serve that function as well.233  Rather, tort law underscores to 
whom we owe obligations by providing the obligees the authority to call us 
to account.  This is a purpose worthy of the coercive power of the state, and 
therefore a plausible justification for tort law. 
But is this all too fuzzy?  One might argue that the aspiration to uphold 
the ―normative order‖ can‘t really support the creation of a whole state sys-
tem unless there are actually cycles of violence we need to prevent.  But I 
am not arguing that tort law serves to reduce violence that might otherwise 
erupt, or that tort plaintiffs actually get psychological satisfaction from 
winning a lawsuit or extracting a settlement. 
I am arguing instead that the ―role of the liberal state‖234 is in part to 
reinforce social equality and to make it possible for each to pursue her own 
ends.  In setting up a vehicle for individuals to bring to account others who 
have harmed them and address their injurers from the ―second-person 
standpoint,‖235 the state reinforces the moral order by treating its citizens as 
autonomous individuals worthy of dignity and respect.  By allowing them 
to bring tort lawsuits, the state underscores Darwall‘s notion of second-
personal authority, the authority to make a legitimate demand on another, to 
hold them to expectations.  And this conferring of authority on victims by 
the state is what makes recourse theory distinctive and, perhaps, politically 
justified. 
In affirming individuals‘ rights to choose and pursue their own ends, 
tort law also affirms our necessary interdependence.236  This whole scheme 
of liberal individualism and limited government, we might say, will only 
work if we each moderate our life–liberty–happiness pursuit with sufficient 
regard for others.237  And where we fall short, we must settle accounts with 
one another before going forward.  That is, our system of tort law attempts 
to translate the idea of morality as mutual accountability into concrete 
terms.   
We can think of accountability in two general ways: as a continuous 
social understanding or as an end-state.  As an end-state, we can think of 
 
 
 
233
  See Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 608 (arguing that tort law 
―build[s] on, amplif[ies], and revise[s] obligations that are already recognized, in part because of habits 
that both shape and are shaped by law‖).  
234
  See Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, supra note 37, at 8–12 (using Rawls‘s ―division of 
responsibility‖ between society and the individual to argue that the state‘s role is to ―enable people to 
take up their own responsibility for their own lives‖). 
235
  See generally DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 127. 
236
  Goldberg offers a version of this idea in Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 
44, at 608–10 (explaining how, ―[a]s a body of law that carves out these loci of responsibility, tort helps 
to maintain a version of civil society that is distinctively liberal‖). 
237
  See Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, supra note 37, at 18 (―[A] regime of equal freedom 
requires everyone to limit their activity in the same ways so as to protect the liberty of others by protect-
ing their ability to use their means to set and pursue their own purposes.‖). 
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accountability as the state of being when all accounts are settled.238  Merck 
has been held accountable for its actions by Carol Ernst, for example.  The 
scales of justice are even.239  We can exhale.  We have . . . Accountability.  
This is consistent with corrective justice ideas, but this is not the version of 
accountability that I think underwrites tort law. 
Rather, it is accountability as a constant social understanding that tort 
law serves to reinforce.  By a constant social understanding, I mean that we 
understand—as we go about our lives, make our choices and plan our activ-
ities—that we are answerable to one another.  We understand if the pursuit 
of our own ends is not conducted with due care for others, we may be held 
to account by those we harm.  By harming others, we incur a moral or so-
cial debt that may be translated into a financial one.240  And those we harm 
may call us into the legal system to settle our accounts. 
We also understand that in a society of strangers, we can drive to work, 
go to the doctor, go shopping at the supermarket—and even though we 
don't know our fellow drivers, the supermarket proprietor, or even our doc-
tor very well, if at all—we know that there is a system of law available to us 
if necessary to hold one of these others accountable if they harm us.  We 
similarly know that they are aware that we have this right, and this gives us 
confidence to conduct our affairs.241 
We don't need to wait until a lawsuit is filed before settling our ac-
counts, of course.  That is why some hospitals have made apologies to vic-
tims of medical malpractice in order to try to settle accounts in a proactive 
way, and have met with some success in doing so.242  If we know a lawsuit 
is likely to expose our wrongful behavior, we can compensate the victim 
 
 
 
238
  See MILLER, supra note 175, at 15 (―Peace is about settling accounts, paying back what you 
owe.‖). 
239
  See id. at 4–5 (discussing balancing the scales of justice, with the ―core justice question‖ ans-
wered by evenness of the scales). 
240
  See id. at 40 (discussing tort law as a system ―in which one is made ‗whole‘ with money‖ for 
nonmonetary losses, such as the loss of a limb). 
241
  So far, I have offered the idea of equal accountability as the normative grounding for our system 
of tort law, but it may also be that a related justification is at work here as well: this backstop of a state-
sponsored system of mutual accountability gives us the confidence we need to conduct our affairs in a 
society of strangers and to enter into various kinds of relationships with others in order to accomplish 
our ends.  A full exploration of this idea is beyond the scope of this paper, but rather than argue for the 
normative appeal of a state that provides a substitute for vengeance, we might instead profitably think 
about the normative unattractiveness of a liberal state without it. 
242
  See Marlynn Wei, Doctors, Apologies, and the Law: An Analysis and Critique of Apology Laws, 
40 J. HEALTH L. 107, 108 (2007) (noting that supporters of ―apology laws‖ claim that they will encour-
age doctors to disclose errors and subsequently reduce the number of medical malpractice lawsuits).  See 
generally Aaron Lazare, The Healing Forces of Apology in Medical Practice and Beyond, 57 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 251 (2008) (discussing the potential positive consequences of medical professionals apologizing 
to victims of malpractice, while noting some risks of such apologies).  
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prior to any legal action, just as the routinized system of auto insurance now 
does for small or modest claims of injury to person or property.243 
We can think of this version of accountability from the perspective of 
potential plaintiffs, potential defendants, and the state.  From the defen-
dant‘s perspective, Zipursky captures the idea when he says that tort liabili-
ty is ―a form of vulnerability to the one who has been wronged.‖244  From 
the state‘s perspective, by establishing a system whereby individuals can 
hold those who have wronged them legally accountable, the state unders-
cores the moral accountability we have toward one another as well.  The 
state does this simply by establishing the system and making it available.245  
It is not necessary for wrongdoers to actually be held accountable to achieve 
the normative force of the state‘s action.246   
Carol Ernst247 might have been advised by her attorney that she had a 
strong case, but ultimately have decided that she did not want to go through 
the hassle of litigation.  Instead, she might have decided to ―move on.‖  Her 
actual decision is of no moment to an accountability-centered justification 
for tort law like the one I offer here.  She knew that she was not just a mod-
estly paid nurse, or her husband an underpaid Wal-Mart worker,248 neither 
of whom mattered in a society enamored with wealth.  She could call the 
big multinational company to account, and by knowing that she had such a 
right, she affirmed her moral and social worth.  By providing her with this 
right, the state affirmed her moral and social worth as well.249 
One might say, then, that tort law supports a particular moral order of 
equal accountability.  The state translates this vision of morality—which I 
am taking primarily from the work of Stephen Darwall250 but is certainly 
 
 
 
243
  See Steven Sugarman, A Century of Change in Personal Injury Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2403, 
2415 (2000) (describing one change, namely that ―small claims are paid off at excessive levels by insur-
ers who are eager to clear their dockets and afraid to take a chance that juries might award victims 
extravagantly high sums‖). 
244
  See Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility, supra note 98, at 110. 
245
  See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 739 (―The role of the state in a tort action is not 
to enforce a duty of the defendant‘s, but to empower a plaintiff with a claim.‖). 
246
  Though if the system was flawed such that wrongdoers were not held accountable when they 
should be for arbitrary or other reasons, this would undermine the normative force of having a system of 
tort law. 
247
  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
248
  See Richard Stewart, Even Jurors Shed Tears During Widow‟s Vioxx Testimony/Blaming Drug, 
Carol Ernst Tells About the Night Her Husband Died, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 5, 2005, at B3, available at 
2005 WLNR 24620166 (noting that on the day Carol Ernst‘s husband died, he had worked at the local 
Wal-Mart). 
249
  Cf. Bilz, supra note 172, at 1086–91 (explaining why delegating the task of revenge to the state 
might be preferable because it would help increase the victim‘s social standing).  
250
  See generally DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 127. 
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based on the work of philosophers such as Aristotle,251 Kant,252 and others—
into concrete terms for day-to-day interactions in modern society.   
Bringing a lawsuit against another in response to insufficient regard for 
care is a critical way of underscoring the authority that people have in the 
kind of moral community outlined by Darwall.  By forcing others to answer 
when they have caused harm, we affirm that the ability to demand that oth-
ers take due care is there in the first place.  This helps make intelligible how 
and why the ―right to recourse‖ could be the ―animating idea‖ of tort law.253  
It is commonly said—quite correctly—that when an individual brings a 
tort suit against another, she is attempting to hold that person responsible 
for her harm.  But when an injured person brings a tort lawsuit, she is also 
in part seeking to hold the state responsible.  Here, I mean ―responsible‖ in 
the sense that she is requesting that the state fulfill its role.254  The state has 
undertaken the responsibility, in the liberal conception, to provide a frame-
work under which autonomous individuals can choose what ends to pursue 
against their injurers and carry out these actions against them.  As Ripstein 
has explained, the state‘s role in this scheme, in the context of private law, 
is to enforce the boundaries of this framework, and a tort claim is in some 
sense calling on the state to fulfill this role.255  Indeed, it may be that the lib-
eral state would have less legitimacy if it did not provide such a system.256   
 
 
 
251
  See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK 5.5, 74–76 (T. Irwin trans., 1999); see 
also WEINRIB, supra note 29, at 56–83 (discussing Aristotle‘s early account of corrective justice). 
252
  See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1991); see also WEINRIB, supra note 29, at 85–113 (discussing Kant‘s philosophy of 
right). 
253
  I am not arguing that this is the only way to achieve this goal of second-person moral address, 
see generally DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT, supra note 127, nor do I need to.  My 
project is interpretive; I am loosely trying to make sense of our social practices in the context of tort law. 
254
  See Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, supra note 37, at 8 (discussing the state‘s role ―in 
enabling people to set and pursue their own purposes‖).  Ripstein‘s account uses John Rawls‘s descrip-
tion of the ―division of responsibility‖ between the state and individuals as its starting point.  Under 
Rawls‘s conception, it is up to individuals to choose their own ends, and it is up to the state to provide a 
framework within which individuals can plan their lives and pursue these ends.  See Ripstein, The Divi-
sion of Responsibility, supra note 114, at 1812. 
255
  See Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, supra note 37, at 8, 9.  See also Goldberg, Constitu-
tional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 527 (―It is the duty of every State to provide, in the adminis-
tration of justice, for the redress of private wrongs . . . .‖ (quoting Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 
512, 521 (1885))); Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 44, at 699 (―The state provides the plaintiff with 
a right of action . . . .  [The state is thereby] permitting and empowering plaintiffs to act against those 
who have wronged them . . . .‖).  Besides Ripstein and the recourse theorists, other scholars who make 
similar points include Joseph W. Little, Up With Torts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861, 876 (1987) (―The 
law of torts is a big brick in our foundation of democratic governance based upon tenets of minimal 
government, individual responsibility and personal accountability.‖). 
256
  See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Self-Defense and the State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 471 (2008) 
(arguing that when the state ―fails to live up to its obligation‖ to protect people by offering a mechanism 
of self-defense, for example, the state opens itself to criticism of its legitimacy). 
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IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
Here, I consider a number of likely objections to equal accountability 
as a moral norm supporting tort law generally and recourse theory specifi-
cally.  Specifically, these objections are: (1) this is really just a disguised 
defense of legalized vengeance; (2) unlike corrective justice theory, it fails 
to explain the payment of money damages—indeed, the theory might well 
point towards an apology as a better remedy; (3) contemporary tort law and 
practice does not fit this conception doctrinally or functionally; and (4) this 
is all acceptable in theory, but in practice, tort cases are defended by liabili-
ty insurers and overwhelmingly settled out of court, undercutting any claim 
that this system of law helps instantiate accountability among equals.  I 
consider and respond to each of these objections in turn, before concluding 
with some general implications of this discussion for individual-justice 
theories. 
A. A Defense of Vengeance? 
Some might suggest that a theory that supports ―acting against‖ a 
wrongdoer is really just a thinly disguised argument for vengeance.  Indeed, 
this objection is the heart of Finnis‘s and others‘ responses to recourse 
theory.  We generally think of revenge as something that is not a ―publicly 
admissible motive for individual action,‖257 but rather something which 
―must be suppressed and overcome.‖258  Here, I try to unpack a bit more 
precisely what the charge is and how it ought to be answered. 
Finnis says that civil recourse theory necessarily backs the ―urge to re-
taliate.‖259  Is this true?  The word ―retaliate‖ comes from the Latin root ―ta-
lio,‖ sharing a common origin with the talionic principle at the center of ―an 
eye for an eye‖ justice in the Hebrew Bible.  Merriam-Webster‘s dictionary 
defines retaliate as ―to repay (as an injury) in kind‖ or ―to return like for 
like.‖  Certainly civil recourse theory backs one who has been wronged act-
ing against the wrongdoer, but not necessarily in the way that the words 
―retaliate,‖ ―revenge,‖ or ―vengeance‖ suggest. 
―Vengeance‖ and ―revenge‖ are frequently treated as synonymous 
terms.  Jon Elster defines revenge as ―the attempt, at some cost or risk to 
oneself, to impose suffering upon those who have made one suffer, because 
they have made one suffer.‖260  Nozick, in distinguishing retribution from 
revenge, describes revenge as personal.  Many scholars have seen revenge 
as fundamentally about preserving or maintaining honor.261 
 
 
 
257
  William Ian Miller, In Defense of Revenge, in MEDIEVAL CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL 70 
(1999). 
258
  Id. at 74.  This resistance to revenge or vengeance stems in significant part from Judeo-Christian 
values.  ―Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord.‖  Romans 12:19 (King James). 
259
  Finnis, supra note 75, at 56. 
260
  Jon Elster, Norms of Revenge, 100 ETHICS 862, 862 (1990). 
261
  See, e.g., FRENCH, supra note 143; MILLER, supra note 175. 
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Some have argued, though, that revenge arises more from feelings of 
resentment, which can stem from minor harms or envy, whereas vengeance 
is a reaction to an offense and driven by moral indignation, and is therefore 
more likely to be justified, assuming the act is a proportional response.262  If 
there is such a distinction, then, it might be that the satisfaction from ven-
geance can arise not from making another suffer in kind, but from achieving 
justice.263 
Both revenge and vengeance seem to be defined by the motive for the 
act.264  As Suzanne Uniacke points out, we might judge the very same act to 
be an appropriate act of self-defense in one instance, or a morally inappro-
priate act of revenge in another, simply because the motive for the act was 
different—self-protection versus the desire to inflict like injury on anoth-
er.265 
So are people seeking revenge or vengeance when they act against per-
ceived wrongdoers in some fashion, or more specifically, when they act 
against wrongdoers by filing a lawsuit against them?  Are they seeking to 
inflict a like injury on one who has wronged them? 
I think generally they are not.  There are at least two critical aspects of 
vengeance or revenge that are lacking in the decision to act against a 
wrongdoer generally, and to file suit for a tort claim specifically.  First, 
there is little if any evidence that the motive of most tort plaintiffs is to 
make the defendant ―suffer‖ at all,266 and they certainly do not wish for the 
defendant to suffer in the way that they have.  When someone rear-ends 
you, most people might yell at the other person: ―What the heck were you 
thinking?‖  You would probably follow the socially constructed norm of 
asking for the other person‘s insurance information—and of course such an 
exchange takes place in the shadow of tort law—but you would not take a 
baseball bat to his fender.267   
Second, and relatedly, to the extent the victim is inflicting anything on 
the defendant, the ―injury‖ is of quite a different character.  Generally, the 
victim has suffered a loss of security or bodily integrity, and by bringing a 
lawsuit, the victim infringes on the defendant‘s liberty, both in forcing the 
defendant to handle the lawsuit in some fashion, and in the possibility that 
 
 
 
262
  See, e.g., Suzanne Uniacke, Why Is Revenge Wrong?, 34 J. VALUE INQUIRY 61, 63, 67 (2000). 
263
  Id. at 65. 
264
  Id. at 61 (―We are asking how and why the wrongfulness of an act stems from its having a par-
ticular motive, namely the desire for revenge.‖). 
265
  Id. 
266
  Even in the case of families who filed medical malpractice claims based on perinatal injuries to 
their infants—a tort setting where one might imagine that anger would play a large role—fewer than one 
in five cited the desire to ―seek revenge or protect others from harm‖ as a motivation for filing suit.  See 
Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Follow-
ing Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1359, 1361 (1992). 
267
  But see THE BIG LEBOWSKI (Polygram Filmed Entertainment & Working Title Films 1998) (―I‘ll 
kill your car!‖). 
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the defendant or his insurer will have to pay compensation.  In this way, the 
filing of the lawsuit is better seen as a demand for some kind of answer and 
measure of justice, rather than the infliction of a like injury. 
Understanding precisely how the urge to retaliate or seek revenge re-
lates to tort law and civil recourse theory is important not only to examining 
whether ―acting against‖ the injurer is morally justified, but also to whether 
the state ought to support and contribute resources towards such actions.  
Asking why the state should support the urge to retaliate, as Finnis does, 
might lead to quite a different answer than asking whether the state ought to 
support the instinct to hold another accountable. 
B. Why Not Just Demand Apology or Confront? 
Mrs. Ernst, of course, was doing more than standing up for herself and 
her husband and making a statement to Merck.  The trial provided her with 
an opportunity to confront the party that had wronged her.  But Mrs. Ernst‘s 
―complaint‖ was more than just a complaint; it was a request for money, 
and a lot of it.  This, of course, is true of the overwhelming majority of tort 
lawsuits.  But why should the victim be permitted to request money?   
If tort law is truly about accountability—the moral authority of a plain-
tiff to demand answers from a defendant—why not change the focus of tort 
law to achieve just that?  Tort law could simply provide a forum where vic-
tims can demand answers and perhaps ask for an apology.  Indeed, there is 
increasing evidence in a variety of areas, particularly in medical malpractice 
in the United States, that apologies are effective ways of forestalling law-
suits.268   
Certainly, for some victims, an apology may be enough.  But to the ex-
tent that it is, this says nothing about the importance of an institution that 
allows victims to hold those who have wronged them accountable.  If the 
victim thinks that an apology is enough for the wrongdoer to pay off his 
debt, then that is fine.  But in many cases, the victim may understandably 
feel that ―I'm sorry‖ is insufficient given the wrong.269 
Moreover, as William Ian Miller has demonstrated with reference to 
historical practices and different cultures, compensation in response to a 
wrong has always been an accepted option for settling accounts, and a via-
 
 
 
268
  See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don‟t Know About the Role of Apologies in Re-
solving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1015–24 (reviewing the survey, experimen-
tal, and case-study evidence, but cautioning that considerably more empirical research remains to be 
done); Lee Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 55, 85–87 
(2005) (reviewing the evidence, consisting largely of case studies); see also Russell Korobkin & Chris 
Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
107, 148–49 (1994) (finding that, in an experimental settlement negotiation based on a landlord–tenant 
dispute, tenants were more willing to accept the settlement offer when offered an apology, perhaps be-
cause it ―provided enough vindication of the tenant‘s moral position and sense of equity‖).    
269
  See Goldberg, Constitutional Status of Tort Law, supra note 44, at 602–03 (suggesting that an 
apology would not provide ―satisfaction‖ to those who suffered significant harm). 
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ble alternative to actually taking ―an eye‖ or a life.  Indeed, Miller‘s work is 
in part a reaction to the legal scholars who argue that the purpose of tort law 
is compensation, often through reimbursement for medical bills or wage 
loss, and that this is somehow very different from vengeance.  He says: 
The once dominant view of legal historians—a view that arose in the nine-
teenth century and that is untenable in the face of the evidence, although one 
still hears it recited as gospel in law schools—is that revenge systems gave 
way to compensation systems, which then paved the way for state-delivered 
justice, amidst general rejoicing at the progress.  The fact is that revenge in 
blood invariably coexisted with means of paying off the avenger by transfers 
of property or money-like substances in lieu of blood.  Revenge always coex-
isted with a compensation option.  The conceptual underpinning was exactly 
the same in either case: both revenge and compensation were articulated solely 
in idioms of repayment of debts and of settling scores and accounts.  Revenge 
was compensation using blood, not instead of money, but as a kind of mon-
ey.270 
Carol Ernst‘s husband was fifty-nine years old and worked for $21,700 
a year at Wal-Mart—assume, as the jury found, that Merck deceived the 
Ernsts about the safety of Vioxx in order to make a profit, and that its de-
ception caused the death of Bob Ernst.  Does six years of that Wal-Mart 
salary really constitute a proper accounting of the value of the wrong done 
to Mrs. Ernst?  It seems clear that the answer to this question is no, and yet 
the attack on noneconomic and punitive damages from the tort reform 
movement, which has been quite successful, implies precisely the opposite.   
The preemption efforts imply that providing victims with the ability to 
settle accounts—establishing answerability—is unnecessary.  If regulation 
needs to be done, this regulation should be done by the FDA, not state tort 
law.  If medical bills need to be paid, health insurance should be responsi-
ble.  Life insurance, social security, and sometimes workers‘ compensation 
should provide any additional financial support needed for widows and oth-
er loved ones.  These efforts seem to indicate that allowing for compensa-
tion as a measure of justice is not a proper activity for law.  I disagree. 
C. General Lack of Fit with Contemporary Tort Law and Practice 
Another set of objections claims that this conception of tort law, even 
if normatively appealing, does not and cannot fit with contemporary tort 
law and practice.  These objections come from a few different directions.   
First, doctrinally, that by only recognizing certain kinds of injuries as 
cognizable wrongs, tort is radically underinclusive if designed to address 
instances where one wrongs another.271  Second, functionally, that modern-
 
 
 
270
  MILLER, supra note 175, at 25 (footnotes omitted). 
271
  In other ways, one could say that tort as civil recourse is overinclusive, for example, by allowing 
punitive damages that far exceed the measure of the harm done by a defendant to a particular plaintiff, 
and by allowing vicarious liability in instances where the defendant employer had used due care but is 
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day tort is the equivalent of a social insurance scheme, and this civil re-
course conception relies on an atavistic notion of social interaction that fits 
better with medieval honor societies.272  In the next section, I also consider a 
related objection: that the prevalence of settlement and insurance in the tort 
system precludes a meaningful system of private wrongs.  
The doctrinal objection is that if tort law is really given normative in-
telligibility by the kind of Darwallian moral theory I deploy above in Part 
II, then it seems to suffer, first, from a serious problem of underinclusivi-
ty—specifically, that only wrongs that happen to result in injury count as 
torts.273  Take as an example a dinner party where I describe an acquain-
tance of those gathered as ―a real jerk.‖  My motivation for saying this—
let's hypothesize—is that the acquaintance has gotten a job I wanted, and 
I'm jealous.  By any moral code, I have acted wrongfully, and have 
wronged this person.  And under Darwall's second-person standpoint, criti-
cal to understanding the importance of civil recourse theory, it is important 
in our moral and social practices for this person to be able to confront me 
and hold me accountable.   
And yet tort law does not allow this person to do that.  The likely claim 
of defamation would fail on one of several grounds, including that the 
statement is not actionable because it is an opinion not based on discernable 
fact; the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the statement is false; and perhaps 
the plaintiff is unable to show real harm to his standing in the community.274  
No self-respecting lawyer would take this case. 
So can tort law really be about the right to confront one who has 
wronged you?  I think it can.  Just because tort law does not recognize all 
wrongs, that does not mean that it cannot be about wrongs at all.  Even if 
tort serves to instantiate a set of moral obligations, it must nonetheless func-
tion as a legal system.275  The injury requirement can be seen as rendering 
                                                                                                                           
nonetheless held responsible for the actions of an employee.  I think this argument has some force, and 
will explore it further in future work. 
272
  Though others have made this point in different ways, I owe this particular formulation to Ed 
Rubin.  Cf. EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT 153–54 (2005) (describing the commitment to prom-
ise-keeping contained in social contract theory as a remnant of medieval honor societies, and out of 
place in our ―contemporary social ethos‖). 
273
  See Goldberg & Zipursky, Internal Point of View, supra note 44, at 1586 (describing the critique 
as saying that ―legal ‗duties‘ that provide the basis for liability in tort seem to be both seriously underin-
clusive and seriously overinclusive relative to standard notions of morality and moral duties‖).  A related 
version of this claim is made by the critics of corrective justice on ―moral luck‖ grounds, frequently 
when discussing the causation requirement.  See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Causation and Corrective 
Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 L. & PHIL. 1, 12–17 (1987) (describing the causation require-
ment as a ―fatal condition‖ at the core of corrective justice).  But see Goldberg & Zipursky, Moral Luck, 
supra note 44, at 1132–40 (rebutting the ―causal luck‖ critique).  
274
  See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 912–13 (1997) (outlining the elements of 
defamation). 
275
  See Goldberg & Zipursky, Internal Point of View, supra note 44, at 1586 (―[B]ecause law comes 
with consequences that morality does not (most obviously state-enforced sanctions), and because there 
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this legal system of private wrongs manageable either at a macro level 
(without it, the system would be swamped with claims), or at a micro level 
in that individual claims would not be adjudicable without an injury to 
serve as evidence of the causal link of the wrong to the harm.276   
The functional objection is that tort law is serving more as a social in-
surance scheme than as a vehicle for individual justice.277  The evidence for 
this is in part based on the fact that the bulk of tort claims are overwhel-
mingly accidental physical injuries.278  Addressing this objection fully is 
beyond this scope of the Article, but for now, this claim ignores a few other 
significant data points.279  First, though accidental physical injuries are in-
deed most of the claims that are filed, other claims such as defamation, as-
sault, nuisance, and fraud are quite important in the overall culture of and 
popular discourse about tort law specifically and lawsuits more generally.280  
Second, to the extent that this objection is a claim about the motivation of 
tort plaintiffs, it is at odds with evidence drawn from the medical malprac-
tice context indicating that higher-income individuals are more likely to file 
claims than lower-income individuals.281  Finally, the contemporary Ameri-
can tort system bears a close family resemblance to the English tort system  
 
                                                                                                                           
are, at times, demands on law that it take a certain form that renders it efficacious, capable of being in-
ternalized, and amenable to application by judges, there will be times at which it is appropriate for legis-
latures and judges and jurors to decline to elevate certain moral norms to legal norms.‖). 
276
  Another way of thinking about this is that the injury requirement is part of the normative struc-
ture of tort law where particular plaintiffs must have ―substantive standing‖ to confront defendants who 
they claim have wronged them.  Goldberg & Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, supra note 44, at 1643–44 (de-
scribing the injury requirement as one of ―standing set by tort law‖); see also supra note 197. 
277
  Though related, this argument is distinct from the legalized vengeance argument described 
above in Part IV.A.  That argument was essentially that the right to recourse cannot have normative ap-
peal because it bears too close a relationship to a concept with negative normative appeal: retaliation or 
vengeance.  The argument here is a functional one: tort is serving as a social insurance mechanism, not a 
vehicle for individual justice.  To be sure, the arguments are related, and might go this way: How do we 
know that tort is serving a regulatory function?  Because the function that recourse theorists ascribe to it 
has so little normative appeal that it cannot possibly be true. 
278
  See SUGARMAN, supra note 86, at 63. 
279
  Besides those that I offer, see also John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 
42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1221, 1234–38 (2008) (rebutting the claim that the late nineteenth-century emer-
gence of the term ―torts‖ meant the ―abandonment of the 500-year-old practice of inviting and adjudicat-
ing claims by injury victims against wrongdoers allegedly responsible for those injuries in favor of a 
new scheme of accident prevention or relief provision‖). 
280
  See Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity To Sue in England and the United States of America: Blam-
ing and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L.S. 400, 420–21 (1991) (using the idea of culture to help explain 
higher rates of claiming behavior in the United States compared to England).  See generally MARSHALL 
S. SHAPO, TORT LAW AND CULTURE (2003) (analyzing American tort law as a reflection of society).  
281
  See Kevin D. Hart & Philip G. Peters, Cultures of Claiming: Local Variation in Malpractice 
Claim Frequency, 5 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 77, 91 (2008) (finding household income to be the strongest 
predictor of filing a claim); see also Roger Feldman, The Determinants of Medical Malpractice Inci-
dents: Theory of Contingency Fees and Empirical Evidence, 7 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 59, 62 (1979) (also 
finding household income to be a predictor).  
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on which it is based, but England has a significantly more extensive social 
insurance system than the United States, including universal health insur-
ance. 
D. Settlement & Insurance 
Another objection relates to the widespread practice of individuals and 
entities holding liability insurance, and the overwhelming majority of cases 
settling before trial.  Together, these practices present a challenge to my 
suggested justification for recourse theory along the following lines: ―Even 
if in theory the law of torts might help achieve or instantiate mutual accoun-
tability among equals,‖ the objection goes, ―the way tort law actually works 
means that no such accountability is actually achieved.‖ 
Because most individuals and entities hold liability insurance, in most 
torts cases the defendants are not actually the alleged wrongdoers.  Rather, 
they are the wrongdoers‘ insurance company.  Take the three most common 
kinds of tort cases in the United States today: auto accidents, premises lia-
bility, and medical malpractice.282  In each of these categories, almost every 
person or entity sued is going to have a liability insurance provider that will 
take over the defense of the case and pay the cost of any settlement or 
judgment.283  Therefore, the plaintiff is not ―acting against‖ the wrongdoer 
in any real sense; rather, she is ―seeking payment from‖ an insurance com-
pany.  The insurance company might hold the insured ―accountable‖ by 
raising premiums if it has to pay too much, but this is not the same as the 
plaintiff holding the wrongdoer accountable. 
This is a familiar objection raised against various theories of tort law, 
not just those that focus on individual justice, and it deserves to be taken se-
riously.  Nonetheless, I think it is by no means fatal to this kind of theory.  
The purpose of this kind of interpretive theory of tort law is to understand 
how the institution of law is functioning.  If the parties acting within that 
system make arrangements such as purchasing insurance ex ante to deal 
with the prospect of being held accountable, that does not fundamentally 
change the nature of the social institution itself.284  Moreover, the fact that 
the wrongdoer is often not the defendant gives greater force to the argument 
that the salient feature of the institution of tort is what it does for victims—
 
 
 
282
  See Smith, supra note 106, at 2. 
283
  See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW 
FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008) (describing and analyzing the interaction between tort and 
liability insurance). 
284
  Liability insurance might even further advance some of the objectives of tort law.  See Goldberg, 
Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, supra note 279, at 1268–69 (suggesting that widespread liability insur-
ance has made the opportunity for redress more available, thereby contributing to the ―democratization 
of tort law‖); Gary Schwartz, The Economics and Ethics of Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 
313, 365 (1990) (arguing in part that liability insurance may advance fairness goals associated with tort 
law). 
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empowering them to demand answers and justice—not to wrongdoers, 
whether through pricing risky activity or defining obligations.285 
The second objection stems from the fact that a majority of these tort 
claims are settled before trial.  Thus, some might argue that my example of 
Carol Ernst confronting Merck and its executives in a Texas courtroom 
could not be more inapposite to the reality of our civil justice system, where 
few cases ever make it to trial.  But the response to this argument is similar 
to the response to the insurance objection: what tort law does provide vic-
tims like Mrs. Ernst is the power to hold wrongdoers to account—if the 
wrongdoers decide to settle accounts before a public trial, this is quite tang-
ible evidence that the right to recourse is real and not just symbolic.  In pay-
ing a settlement, the defendant has indeed been held to account. 
Finally, it is not at all clear that the ―law in action‖ research on our tort 
system cuts against, rather than supports, a system of mutual accountability.  
For example, Tom Baker, a leading ―law in action‖ torts scholar, has stu-
died the practices of liability insurers defending tort cases and found that 
the role of ―blood money‖—money over and above the insurance policy 
limit that would therefore come out of the individual or entity‘s pocket—
does play a major role in settlement negotiations in certain kinds of cases.286  
This might indicate that where the harm is particularly severe, or the con-
duct at issue particularly wrongful, insurers are forced to settle accounts to 
prevent ―blood money‖ from entering the picture. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article started with the hope that understanding the normative ap-
peal of a law of civil recourse might help illuminate what is at stake in de-
bates over preemption and tort reform.  Here, I simply offer a few 
observations on these issues, and then some additional thoughts on the theo-
retical implications of the idea of equal accountability as the heart of tort 
law.   
For preemption, the logic of the ―implied preemption‖ doctrine as-
sumes that tort law is a state regulatory regime intended to complement the 
federal regulatory regime governed, for example, by the Food and Drug 
Act.287  If one is persuaded that tort as civil recourse can be defended nor-
matively, then one might be more willing to believe that tort is really (or 
primarily, or also) about individual justice.  If that is the case, then that con-
siderably weakens the argument for implied preemption based on the idea 
that the federal government is already occupying the regulatory space that 
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  Thanks to Gautam Huded for this point. 
286
  See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 
35 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 275, 277 (2001). 
287
  See supra text accompanying notes 7–16.   
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the states seek.  Though I do not offer the argument in this paper as a theory 
of adjudication particularly, this is one area where it might play such a role. 
In the context of tort reform, I think the implications are even strong-
er.288  When a state legislature is considering a cap on or even the elimina-
tion of noneconomic damages, for example, the idea of tort as a vehicle for 
justice for people who have been wronged cuts against such a move.  A se-
vere limit on noneconomic damages might mean that certain plaintiffs, par-
ticularly children and the elderly, are not awarded the proper measure of 
compensation for the wrong done to them.289  Such a cap might be of less 
concern, though, if the purpose of tort law was to insure against the risk of 
lost wages and medical bills due to physical injuries.290  Cutting in the other 
direction might be proposals to eliminate or limit joint and several liabili-
ty.291  If the purpose of tort law is for individuals to be able to hold account-
able those who have wronged them, then allowing plaintiffs to recover from 
defendants more than their proportionate share of responsibility might be 
undesirable.  Whereas if tort law was more a form of localized distributive 
justice, then asking a culpable defendant to pick up the share of an insolvent 
fellow wrongdoer might well make sense. 
I have introduced and defended this notion of equal accountability as 
the conceptual underpinning of a particular theory of individual justice, civ-
il recourse theory, but I think it holds great promise for explaining and justi-
fying tort law more broadly.  Before concluding, I will propose that 
Darwall‘s notion of equal accountability can help corrective justice theory 
as well.  A full exploration of this possibility is beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle, but I offer some preliminary suggestions here.   
It may be that this notion of accountability—providing civil recourse 
ex post to ensure respect and equality ex ante—offers a way of underscor-
ing and reinforcing Kantian equality without restoring a balance that may 
itself have been distributively unjust.292  In this way, accountability might 
 
 
 
288
  In this way, the argument in the paper might be as useful or more so to legislators than judges. 
289
  For related ideas, see Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, supra note 279, at 1255–58 
(arguing that the ―make whole‖ formulation for damages is inaccurate historically and misleading con-
ceptually); John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 
DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 438–47 (2006) (discussing the idea of ―fair compensation‖ in Blackstone‘s Com-
mentaries and other treatises). 
290
  California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor put the point nicely in a dissent in a case in-
volving damages for pain and suffering: ―Such damages originated under primitive law as a means of 
punishing wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings of those who had been wronged. . . .  They become 
increasingly anomalous as emphasis shifts in a mechanized society from ad hoc punishment to orderly 
distribution of losses through insurance and the price of goods or of transportation.‖  Seffert v. L.A. 
Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 345 (Cal. 1961) (citations omitted) (quoted in PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY 
132 (1988)).  
291
  See Hubbard, supra note 18, at 488–92 (describing such changes). 
292
  A related account is offered by Martin Stone, who provides an alternative reading of Aristotle‘s 
use of the word ―equality‖ in his discussion of corrective justice.  See Martin Stone, The Significance of 
Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 156–59 (Gerald Postema ed. 2001) (ex-
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provide a ―point or purpose‖293 to corrective justice that relates to a kind of 
distributive justice in a way that parallels Jules Coleman‘s mapping of the 
relationship.  Under this view, we have a society with an equal distribution 
of Kantian right—the right to pursue one‘s own ends and demand that oth-
ers not treat you as a means to their own ends.  Corrective justice serves to 
preserve this distributively just allocation by allowing individuals to hold 
others to account; with corrective justice, we have a means of ―restoring the 
moral order.‖ 
This sort of understanding might also provide a bridge between the no-
tions of normative loss and factual loss that has divided corrective justice 
theorists.  When one wrongfully harms another, he is subject to confronta-
tion by the victim and a demand to settle accounts.  The wrongdoer must 
pay the debt—but it is not a debt that precisely corresponds to what the 
plaintiff lost.294  If one person accidentally and wrongfully breaks another‘s 
leg, he doesn‘t just give him money for a prosthetic or his medical treat-
ment because someone has to pay for the mess.295  When we look around to 
make the distributive choice of who should be held financially responsible, 
we conclude as a matter of fairness that one or more injurers have behaved 
in such a way that they ought to compensate the victim.296  The injurer 
might be liable for an amount that is arrived at through estimates of medical 
expenses, wage loss, pain and suffering, and even ―special‖ damages to ac-
count for particularly severe wrongs.  In this way, the normative loss is 
measured in part by the factual loss—the two are linked, but the normative 
loss is analytically prior or paramount. 
Equal accountability might just be the morally appealing norm that can 
underwrite both major contenders of individual justice theory.  Indeed, it 
might help bridge the methodological divide.  The social practice or under-
standing of accountability—the ability to hold others accountable for 
wrongs done to them (call it civil recourse)—is an important feature of our 
normative order.  Understanding the role of accountability helps make sense 
                                                                                                                           
plaining that this reading might interpret conduct as wrongful, and a departure from equality, because it 
is ―inconsistent with the equal status of other affected agents‖).  Stone also indicates that the idea of re-
sponsibility at work in this kind of corrective-justice framework is not just about when someone may be 
blamed for her actions, but rather has to do with ―the answerability of persons, potentially indifferent to 
one another, living in civic association.‖  Id. at 159.     
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  See Steven Walt, Eliminating Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1311, 1320 (2006). 
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  This view runs counter to that presented in Ripstein, As If It Had Never Happened, supra note 
39, at 1972. 
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  This view runs counter to that presented in Jules L. Coleman, Second Thoughts and Other First 
Impressions, in ANALYZING LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 257, 302 (Brian Bix ed., 1998) 
(―Tort law is about messes.  A mess has been made, and the only question before the court is, who is to 
clean it up?‖).  It is this ―localized distributive justice‖ approach that is disapproved of by wrongs-based 
theorists like Weinrib and the recourse theorists. 
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  See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 73, at 222 (―When an accident occurs, costs are created.  Some-
one has to bear those costs.  No matter how hard we may wish them away, they won‘t disappear.  The 
only question is, Who should bear these costs?‖).   
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of the conceptual structure and the features of the legal process itself, while 
the monetary remedy fits well with a notion of settling accounts, as it has 
been for centuries as a substitute for literally taking ―an eye‖ for an eye. 
Finally, the idea of mutual accountability in a community of equals 
might just provide us with an answer to the three questions with which we 
began: What is it we are preempting?  What is it we are reforming?  And, 
most importantly, what is tort law for? 
It does not necessarily provide an answer for the outcomes of cases or 
even help us make doctrinal choices.  The companion concept of responsi-
bility, focusing more on the defendant, might be more useful in answering 
these questions.  But mutual or equal accountability helps provide the 
framework within which we can start asking these questions.  Moreover, 
more work needs to be done to assess how such a system of equal accoun-
tability might function better. 
By viewing tort law as a system that provides for accountability, we 
can see what Carol Ernst was seeking in that Texas courtroom when she 
sued Merck on behalf of herself and her husband: not ―eye for an eye‖-style 
justice, but ―eye to eye‖ justice.  She had the opportunity to look at those 
Merck representatives and force them to answer to her and treat her with 
equal respect.  My argument here has been that the principal value of tort 
law might well be in making that possible.  
 
 
